The student-led movement to end mass atrocities.

Answers and Analysis: Employing Military Options for Genocide Prevention

Last week’s discussion topic focused on the fifth chapter of the Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF) Report, employing military options. While the GPTF report emphasizes the immense importance of prevention, to assume that preventive measures will be successful is to be unprepared for the instance of their failure. While initial action begins with nonmilitary preventive mechanisms, there may be a time when consideration and use of military options is necessary. It is important to keep in mind that it is not an all-or-nothing choice between doing nothing militarily and sending in the Marines with guns blazing; there is a wide spectrum of military involvement. This range of available options, if it becomes necessary, should be pursued while working with partners such as the UN, African Union, ECOWAS, NATO, and the EU.

Last week’s trivia question addressed the challenges of employing military options. There are great challenges to acknowledge in the use of military intervention in genocide and mass atrocities. Your answers may have included any of the following: Because of the nature of genocide, forces can not be neutral and must chose sides. The American public may express concern about the use of military force, being unaware of the range of options available. There are also international political challenges; actions that are not authorized by the UN Security Council or out of self defense are considered illegitimate at best, illegal at worst. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is a step forward around this challenge. An additional challenge is that the US military may not be prepared for a mission of this kind where the main objective is the protection of civilians.

Our discussion question asked you to consider the impact the GPTF recommendations on employing military options would impact Sudan, Congo, and Burma. Below, the E-team provides their analysis.

SUDAN

The US can fully expect a return to violence in any one of Sudan’s hotspots, and it must learn its lessons both from the bloody past of Sudan itself and its neighboring and nearby countries Kenya, Congo, and Rwanda to name a few. The US may need to prepare for concrete civilian protection activities, such as preparing to reinforce UNAMID or UNMIS, preparing to work with regional forces such as neighboring national armies or African Union peacekeepers, and preparing potential internal military responses that could protect civilians from further violence.

BURMA

Unlike the conflict in Darfur, UN or foreign troops have not been deployed for peacekeeping in Burma. However, should the conflict reach the level where military intervention is justified and necessary, the United States and the international community must be prepared to engage. Recommendation 5-2 suggests that “the director of national intelligence and the secretary of defense should leverage military capacities for intelligence and early warning and strengthen links to political-military planning and decision-making.” Because of drastic nature of a full-scale intervention, it’s important to consistently monitor the situation with a high enough level of intelligence to develop a response that takes a range of options into account rather than full-scale intervention.

CONGO

It is clear that DRC’s national army is neither sufficiently trained nor equipped to deal with the current crisis. Thanks to Operation Kimia II, MONUC soldiers have been working alongside FARDC to protect civilians from recurrent attacks, though with only meager achievements. Military intervention is a process that would benefit from serious research of dynamics of the conflict and therefore informed steps and engagements. This would stream line operations like the integration of former rebels into the national army; giving more attention to the re-indoctrination and training process would go a long way in matching ideals and preventing incidents like the ongoing looting, rape and killings being done by the newly formed coalition between FARDC and former rebels whose careless merging has created a dangerous situation. That way, peace efforts can move forward and the military intervention can have meaning.

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Trivia and Discussion: Sudan’s Elections

TRIVIA 
Q: What will citizens be voting for in Sudan’s April 2010 elections?
 
DISCUSSION

In countries emerging from violent conflict, the international community has presented free and fair elections as the mechanism for establishing legitimate and stable government. And so, from April 11th – 13th this year, the citizens of Sudan will cast their votes for both the president of the republic and for the semi-autonomous south, as well as for national, southern, and state legislative assemblies.  

 
Why are these elections so important? 
 
KEY FACTS ABOUT THE ELECTIONS:
  • 75.8% of eligible Sudanese were registered during the voter registration period ending in December 2009 according to National Election Committee (NEC) statistics. 
  • The Carter Center’s review of the process found it to be generally peaceful and commendable, but without the full incorporation of Darfur voters and Internally Displaced People living in camps.
  • Elections will be held for six levels of government, including the presidential seat. Approximately 70 political parties have already registered for the election.
  • To date, there are 12 presidential candidates who include:
    • Abdullah Deng Nhial (Popular Congress Party)
    • Mubarak Al Fadil (Umma Reform and Renewal Party)
    • President Omar Hassan al-Bashir (National Congress Party)
    • Yassir Arman (SPLM)
  
 
IMAGINING THE ELCTION: THE NDI (NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUE) EXPLORES ATTITUDES ABOUT THE 2010 SUDAN VOTE 
      Thoughts from the citizens themselves: 

“Elections are meant to choose a democratically elected president who will listen to us because we shall have strong influence on his leadership, since we are the ones who choose him.  “ 

 

“[Multi-party competition] is good in places like America and Britain where people don’t fight over election results, but for Sudan’s case, it is good to start with only two parties so that people can learn the ways of good elections.” 

 
“We do not want to hear about NCP anymore…Even though that candidate from NCP is my mother, I cannot welcome her here.” 
“What makes me think an election is fair is only when the international community is involved to monitor the election.” 
 

“It is always my wish to vote in the elections if the time comes…Of course, I will vote because that is what I have been waiting for.” 

 
“It [voting in secret] is very good because it will never create any conflict between the people on whom they voted for.” 
 

“Surely, that [voting in secret] is a bad idea.  We are not educated; we cannot read or write.  How will we know this is the paper for my candidate?” 

To read more from the citizens themselves click HERE 
 
THOUGHTS FROM THE NDI:  

      After interviewing many people, the NDI came up with some generalizations that participants in Southern Sudan and the three areas have limited knowledge of the national elections planned for 2010.  They define its purpose as fulfilling a CPA milestone and as an opportunity to choose more effective and responsive leaders. They also discovered that most Southern Sudanese participants believe the 2010 election will only involve the offices of president of the Republic of Sudan and/or President of the Government of Southern Sudan and are aware that other positions will be on the ballot as well. Almost all citizens that they talked to said that they intend to vote in the election, though they are unaware of the need to register first. The citizens also said that the only factors that could prevent them from voting are” insecurity, inaccessible polling stations or ID requirement.” Also, NDI discovered that the knowledge of political parties is limited, and is particularly low among women; however, the SPLM is the most widely recognized and supported political party in Southern Sudan. 

To read the full NDI report click HERE
 
WHY IS THIS ELECTION SO MONUMENTAL? 

      These elections will be a huge benchmark in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed in 2005. The CPA marked the end of a 21-year civil war between the north and south Sudanese. It was signed by the Government of South Sudan as well as the Government of National Unity. In addition to holding of elections, the CPA also contains elements relating to border demarcation, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into the formation of joint integrated units involving the two sides and a national census. The elections will also set the scene for the milestone 2011 referendum on secession guaranteed to the people of South Sudan.  There are, however, a lot of issues facing the Sudanese as they prepare to vote in April. For example, in Darfur, it will be nearly impossible to conduct fair elections with so much violence and hostility there.  Many U.S. and UN officials are concerned that the government will use military intimidation on the citizens in the polling booths, especially in Darfur. And the government of Sudan right now has refused to lift the media censorship, which means that not all of the political parties have access to the media to publish their ideas freely, and therefore, very few citizens know which parties are campaigning. 

-Emma Smith, National Sudan Education Coordinator

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Weekly News Brief, 3.6.10 – 3.12.10

In this week’s issue: The Enough Project reports that the LRA may be operating in Darfur to seek protection from the Sudanese military; UN Special Rapporteur recommended the establishment of a UN Commission of Inquiry in Burma; one of FARDC’s most abusive commanders continues to receive supplies from the UN

Weekly News Brief: March 6 to 12, 2010, compiled by Joshua Kennedy of GI-Net and the STAND E-team. To receive weekly news briefs, trivia, and a discussion guide, email education@standnow.org.

 

Areas of Concern

Sudan
 
Burma
Democratic Republic of Congo
Afghanistan
 
Iraq
Pakistan
Somalia

Sri Lanka

Around the World

Nigeria

Central African Republic

Guinea

 

Trivia and Discussion: Preventing Genocide and Employing Military Options

TRIVIA

What are the challenges to employing military options for genocide prevention? Name two.

Hint: You’ll find the answer in the following discussion guide. 

DISCUSSION

The Genocide Prevention Task Force Report outlines the challenges of and recommendations for the inclusion of early prevention of genocide and mass atrocities into US foreign policy. While the report analyzes these recommendations on a general level, it does not specifically apply them to current conflicts or troublesome areas which threaten to become conflict zones.   

How would the GPTF recommendations on employing military options impact the conflicts in Sudan, Congo, Burma and other areas of concern if they were implemented into government policy? 

Read the fifth chapter of the GPTF report here. 
 

KEY FACTS ON EMPLOYING MILITARY OPTIONS FROM GPTF CHAPTER 5 

  • The United States does not face an all-or-nothing choice between taking no military action and launching a major intervention.
  • While there is a necessary focus on prevention, we cannot assume preventive measures will succeed.
  • Challenges to employing military options:
    • The nature of genocide (can’t be neutral; must take sides)
    • Domestic political challenges (public does not understand whole scale of military options)
    • International political challenges (if actions aren’t authorized by the UNSC or out of self defense- illegitimate at best, illegal at worst; "responsibility to protect" is a step forward with this problem)
    • Military challenges (primary objective is protection of civilians, not a goal or consequence of broader aim; is the US military prepared for something like this?)
  • Most important tools for military preparedness: national policy, doctrine, plans, and training
  • Check out the charts on page 82 and 83 of the GPTF Report to see the process of violence and graduated military options
  • The US should work with partners- UN, AU and ECOWAS, NATO and EU

 

 

GPTF RECOMMENDATIONS 

  • Recommendation 5-1: The secretary of defense and U.S. military leaders should develop military guidance on genocide prevention and response and incorporate it into Department of Defense (and interagency) policies, plans, doctrine, training, and lessons learned.
    • Genocide prevention would be integrated into already existing defense planning.
    • Language on protecting civilians from mass atrocities should be included in the rules of engagement (ROE) issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    • The US should support mapping out the range of early and longer term options to prevent or halt actors from committing atrocities; there should be a clear indication of "interruption points" within the development of conflict.
  • Recommendation 5-2: The director of national intelligence and the secretary of defense should leverage military capacities for intelligence and early warning and strengthen links to political-military planning and decision making.
    • Strengthening the military’s role in intelligence and early warning is important for dispelling false idea of only being able to do nothing or launch an intervention.
    • Defense intelligence capabilities can strengthen the link between indicators of potential violence and use of military assets; genocide indicators should be introduced into military intelligence
  • Recommendation 5-3: The Departments of Defense and State should work to enhance the capacity of the United Nations, as well as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and other regional and subregional bodies to employ military options to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities.
    • The US should support and reinforce UN and other international peace keeping efforts.
  • Recommendation 5-4: The Departments of Defense and State should work with NATO, the European Union, and capable individual governments to increase preparedness to reinforce or replace United Nations, African Union, or other peace operations to forestall mass atrocities.
    • Missions may need rapid reinforcements if peacekeeping operations come under threat themselves or if violence escalates. (ex. Rwanda)
    • The US can also provide logistics and operational capabilities.
  • Recommendation 5-5: The Departments of Defense and State should enhance the capacity of the United States and the United Nations to support a transition to long-term efforts to build peace and stability in the wake of genocidal violence.
    • Long-term support for post-conflict rebuilding is important for sustainable peace.

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Weekly News Brief, 2.20.10 – 3.5.10

In this week’s issue: after JEM rebels and the Sudanese government signed a framework agreement, clashes and instability remain; Tensions are rising between the Burmese military and Karen Independence Organization and troops are being deployed; Global Witness is pushing the EU to exclude imports of Congo’s conflict minerals

 

Your weekly news brief, February 20 to March 5, compiled by Joshua Kennedy of GI-Net and the STAND E-team. Email education@standnow.org to receive weely education emails including news briefs, trivia, and discussion guides.

 

Areas of Concern

Sudan
 
Burma
  • Burma’s Supreme Court rejected Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal to overturn her house arrest, which precludes her from participating in the 2010 elections.  Suu Kyi will be seeking a special appeal.
  • On February 18, UN Special Human Rights Envoy Tomas Ojea Quintana met with Tin Oo, vice-chairman of the National League for Democracy, and visited Insein Prison to examine Burmese treatment of political prisoners.  He was not allowed to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi.
  • The Thai Labor Ministry announced that 500,000 migrant workers who missed the March 2 to renew work permits will be deported to their country of origin. International labor organizations have protested, saying that migrant workers may face human rights violations if forcibly repatriated.
  • Tensions are rising between the Burmese military and the Karen Independence Organization as they continue to negotiate over the Border Guard Force.  The Burmese Army has increased security along northern trade routes while the Karen Independence Army is recruiting soldiers and conducting military training.
  • An order has been released for all Burmese Army divisions and battalions in Shan State and Kachin State to prepare for combat, said sources close to a local Burmese military unit.  It is speculated that the order is meant to prepare an offensive against the KIO and UWSA.   The Burmese government is reportedly deploying 70,000 troops to confront the USWA.
  • The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) reportedly reversed its original decision to accept the regime’s plan for ceasefire groups to become a border guard force.
 
Democratic Republic of Congo
 
Afghanistan
 
Iraq
 
Pakistan
 
Somalia
 

Sri Lanka

 

Around the World

Côte d’Ivoire

  • Xenophobia and electoral violence are reportedly on the rise in advance of this year’s Ivorian elections. Supporters of current President Gbagbo are reportedly calling for the exclusion of suspected foreign nationals on the basis of family names. Tensions over foreign residents of the country was one of the main issues during the Ivorian Civil War.
 
Kenya
 
Rwanda

 

Answers and Analysis: Somalia and Afghanistan

Trivia:When was the last time Somalia had a stable, permanent government? What foreign powers sought influence in Somalia and Afghanistan in the past?  

Answers: Somalia has not had a stable government since 1991. The Soviet Union and the United States have played important roles in both conflicts. Ethiopia and Pakistan, the countries’ neighbors, have also attempted to extend their influence within Somalia and Afghanistan, respectively.   

Discussion Questions:Why have international forces invaded Afghanistan but not Somalia?  What key characteristics do Somalia and Afghanistan share in common? What makes each conflict distinct? Should Somalia’s profile rise internationally, as Afghanistan’s has in recent years?  

Discussion Analysis

Both Somalia and Afghanistan have been mired in chaos for more than a decade. Each has, in its own time, been plagued by bouts of communism (per the oft-unwanted Soviet influence), civil war, Islamic extremism and the threat of terrorism. Somalia continues to be besieged by war and fundamentalism, with few allies willing to help. Yet in Afghanistan, international forces attempt to crush once and for all its Islamist insurgents and the terrorist networks spanning from there.   

During the 1980s, both the Soviet Union and the United States vied to influence Somalia, as they did in Afghanistan. Somalia flirted with whichever power was willing to give it more aid and military assistance; Afghanistan, in the meantime, violently opposed the secularism of communism with the help of U.S. weapons and training. Yet Soviets and Americans alike left the country to its own fate after the departure of Soviet troops from the country, and ignored the civil war that followed.  

Somalia was similarly neglected after the collapse of the Cold War, and its own civil war – which continues to this day – has come to be regarded as an international nightmare. The UN and the United States have refrained from taking any significant role in the country after Operation Restore Hope failed and the Black Hawk Down incident damaged U.S. resolve to intervene in African violence.    

In the years since, both Somalia and Afghanistan have found the powerful influence of their neighbors a problematic challenge. Pakistan supported the Taliban in the 1990s and continues to offer safe haven to thousands of Afghan Taliban militants, but its recent alliance with the United States (and increasing willingness to capture Taliban leaders within its borders) threatens to disrupt that support. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia and attempts to influence the emergence of a government there has outraged Somalis and helped al Shabaab recruit youth to expel all foreign influences, from meddling neighbors and major powers.  

Islamic extremism has also played a large part in the social climate of both countries. In Afghanistan, the Taliban emerged after tribes which had previously been united in fighting the Soviet occupation began warring each other. The Taliban’s authoritarian rule established the law and order – albeit strict and medieval – the country so woefully lacked, uniting the country by the force of Islam. Al Shabaab would like to do the same in Afghanistan. They have already done so in the large swaths of southern and central Somalia which they control, where the rule of law is Sharia.  

The strongest difference between the two is the reason why international forces have invaded Afghanistan and left Somalia to its own – terrorist networks have already found their safe haven in the mountainous and cavernous terrain of Afghanistan, whereas terrorism is considered a fledgling enterprise in ravaged Somalia. Al Qaeda’s presence in Somalia has inspired concern, but not enough for international forces – or even international organizations – to consider providing more aid to the country. Only African Union peacekeepers remain stationed there, and only in Mogadishu. NGOs providing humanitarian assistance have been driven out by intensifying threats from al Shabaab and charges of corruption against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The $200 million in aid pledged in April 2009 has never materialized. More than 80,000 Somalis have been displaced so far in 2010, but the world has taken little notice.  

With al Shaabab’s now explicit allegiance to al Qaeda, Somalia could very well see a Taliban-like regime (akin to the Islamic Courts which briefly ruled the country in 2006) arise if the rebels are successful in routing the TFG. Al Shabaab has successfully recruited thousands of foreign fighters to join their jihad, including some Somali-Americans. The fear is that training camps will be established in Somalia, providing al Qaeda the opportunity to continue planning attacks if coalition forces remove the remaining Taliban militants from Afghanistan and plunging Somalia into further chaos. Al Shabaabs international network is growing, and as such poses a growing threat. 

-Carolina Chacon, National Conflicts of Concern Education Coordinator

 

 

STAND students off to the Thai-Burma border tomorrow

On March 4th, I’m going to the Thai-Burma border, and I couldn’t be more excited.

Before I applied to be STAND’s Burma education coordinator, I didn’t know much about the country. Even though I’d been involved in STAND for a few years, I hadn’t paid much attention to it, and I don’t think I’m the only one. This was partially because it gets almost no attention in US media, and partially my own fault for not trying to educate myself – it just didn’t interest me.

Once I started learning about Burma, that completely changed. Burma’s military regime keeps its people isolated from the outside world, and so the outside world has largely disregarded it. But if you’re willing to pay attention, what’s going on in Burma is fascinating and infuriating. The Burmese military regime has destroyed the Burmese economy, destroyed the Burmese education system, suppressed the civil rights of its people, and continues to carry out brutal and systematic attacks on ethnic minorities, all in order to maintain control over a population struggling for democracy.

Over ten days, I’m going to get the chance to meet with the courageous people who risk their lives and freedom to oppose the regime. I’m traveling with a group of students, including STAND’s very own Matthew Heck, from Bangkok to the border.  We’ll meet with organizations that assist the people of Burma, such as Burmese women’s organizations, an organization that assists political prisoners, and humanitarian organizations.  We’ll also get a chance to talk to Burmese people themselves: refugees who have been forced to flee their homes to escape government attacks, and members of Burmese resistance group who fight for democracy. 

We’ll be video-blogging from the road to share this amazing experience with you, so make sure to keep up with the blog over the next two weeks! Even if you don’t know much about Burma now, there’s no better way to start than to make a personal connection with the people of Burma and get inspired to be part of the solution.

-Morgan McDaniel, STAND National Burma Education Coordinator

Hundreds feared dead, tens of thousands flee fighting in Darfur

Just over one week since JEM rebels signed a ceasefire with the Sudanese government and President Bashir declared that the war in Darfur is over and released 57 JEM rebels from prison, there are reports of clashes between SLA rebels and the government in the mountainous Jabel Marra region of Darfur. Hundreds of civilians are feared dead and tens of thousands have fled as a result. Aid workers and UN agencies report that from 140 to as many as 400 have been killed, though without access to effected areas these numbers cannot be confirmed. An SLA commander reported that there has been government bombing over the past ten days resulting in as many as 170 civilian deaths in the town of Deribat, a rebel stronghold, alone. Attacks in Jabel Marra after the ceasefire were reported as early as last Wednesday. The Sudanese government denies that there has been fighting.

Aid workers are currently unable to gain access to the region due to fighting and threat of banditry, and the French humanitarian organization Médecins du Monde withdrew last Thursday.

JEM’s negotiator in Doha reported that he didn’t believe the parties would make the March 15 deadline for a final peace deal for Darfur.

Op-Ed Calls for More Air Power, at Whatever Civilian Cost

In a chillingly reprehensible op-ed for the New York Times on Feb. 18, Lara Dadkhah, an unidentified defense analyst, argued that the United States and NATO are placing an “overemphasis on civilian protection” in Afghanistan. She called for the use of more airpower to protect U.S. troops and defeat the Taliban. 

Her argument essentially boils down to the concept that decreasing civilian casualties is not in our best military interests. She is completely wrong.  

Firstly, ordering more airpower without concern for mounting civilian casualties is counter-productive to our stated mission in Afghanistan. The very purpose of a counter-insurgency is to win the trust of the people, thereby establishing stability, eliminating support for the opponent and increasing cooperation in intelligence-gathering for preemptive operations. Protecting the population is both an objective and an advantage over the insurgents.  

Dadkhah, however, says Afghans only feel safe to support the U.S. when troops take complete control of an area, but that is not necessarily the case – they trust us when they do not believe we are carelessly killing their fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, friends and family.  

Moreover, the “hearts-and-mind”  strategy Dadkhah so disdainfully casts as ineffective was implemented after the lack of such an approach led to scores of unnecessary Afghan deaths at the hands of U.S. forces that greatly diminished Afghan support for coalition forces from both the population and the Afghan government.  

Secondly, General McChrystal’s guidelines limiting when airstrikes may be called for ensure that when airpower is used, it is used effectively and specifically. The guidelines are not meant to leave troops to suffer undue risk but to reduce the number of accidental Afghan deaths. These tactical restrictions reflect the shifting strategy in Afghanistan: from killing as many militants as possible to winning over as much of the population as possible. 

Moreover, effective fighting or successful operations cannot be adequately measured by the amount of close air support (CAS) in place – less CAS might simply indicate there are more troops on the ground. Drone strikes in Afghanistan are also being increasingly used to provide the continual protection and intelligence gathering Dadkhah says is missing.  

Thirdly, Dadkhah’s article erroneously promotes the idea that all of our objectives are military ones (they’re not; they include governance, development and reconstruction). She seems to view Afghan civilians as merely a roadblock to achieving military victory, by arguing that there is a limited utility to reducing civilian casualties: 

“So in a modern refashioning of the obvious — that war is harmful to civilian populations — the United States military has begun basing doctrine on the premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct of war. The trouble is, no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that claim.” 

But if she would like “compelling proof” of the damage civilian casualties have inflicted on combat operations, perhaps she should study the Soviet example. During the decade-long Soviet occupancy of Afghanistan (1979-1989), Soviet troops took little care to avoid civilian casualties. Yet they were unable to suppress the incensed and insurgent Afghan population; in the end, they were driven out utterly defeated. Gen. McChrystal, and U.S. forces, would be wise not to repeat such a mistake.  

Likewise, she can look at the public reaction in Pakistan over the U.S. use of drone strikes, which have often resulted in civilian casualties. Experts have argued that the use of drones in military operations enrages the population, alienates them from the Pakistani government (a pro-U.S. ally), makes it harder for them to support U.S. objectives and helps militants recruit from the peoples who believe they are under siege from a foreign army.  

If she is still not convinced, then Dadkhah should review the consequences of a NATO airstrike last Sunday night that killed 27 Afghan civilians, including four women and one child. The warplanes mistakenly targeted a group of Afghan travelers, confusing them for Taliban insurgents. The public backlash was strong, and Gen. McChrystal gave a televised apology to the Afghan people that very night. Let us not forget the Sept. 4, 2009 NATO airstrike which killed 90 people, most of the civilians, or the May 2009 NATO airstrike which killed 147 people, also mostly civilians, and incited anti-American and anti-Afghan government riots.  

A U.N. report released in January 2010 showed that civilian casualties in Afghanistan had increased by 14 percent in 2009, to a total of 2,412. But thanks to Gen. McChrystal’s guidelines, the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces dropped 30 percent.  

Dadkhah’s argument is that “wars are always ugly, always monstrous, and best avoided.” She says we must use “every advantage” at our disposal to end the war in Afghanistan quickly. But the advantage here is not to deemphasize the impact of civilian casualties on the war effort – or to eliminate air support, as it is indeed necessary and efficient if properly used – but to stabilize Afghanistan by building trust, protecting the population and training the country’s own security forces to help coalition forces battle insurgents. Simply casting aside concern for civilian deaths will not make U.S. troops safer or the fight any easier.   

As Gen. McChrystal rightly says, “We will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but instead in our ability to separate insurgents from the center of gravity – the people…We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories – but suffering strategic defeats – by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.” 

  • Carolina Chacon, National Conflicts of Concern Education Coordinator

 

 

For more information about Afghanistan, visit GI-NET’s Afghanistan page.

Trivia and Discussion: Afghanistan and Somalia

Trivia: When was the last time Somalia had a stable, permanent government? What foreign powers sought influence in Somalia and Afghanistan in the past? 

Discussion: Why have international forces invaded Afghanistan but not Somalia?  What key characteristics do Somalia and Afghanistan share in common? What makes each conflict distinct? Should Somalia’s profile rise internationally, as Afghanistan’s has in recent years? 
 
 
Both Somalia and Afghanistan share a history of chaos, vacuums of power, extremism and the rise of Islamist militants.  
 
 
Somalia
  • Before 1991, Somalia was contested ideologically by the Soviet Union and the United States, who sought greater influence in the Horn of Africa. After the end of the Cold War, Somalia dropped from both countries’ radars.
  • Since 1991, Somalia has existed without a functioning, permanent central government. The last stable president, Siad Barre, was toppled in 1991 by warring clan militias who afterwards battled each other for control of power.
  • The Islamic Courts Union, a loose group of Islamic groups and their militant militias, ruled Somalia for much of 2006, trying to establish strict order and provide the population with basic services. Meanwhile, the UN attempted to set up a transitional government.
  • Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 in support of the TFG, or Transitional Federal Government. The invasion galvanizes radical Islamist militants who unite to drive Ethiopian forces out. Al Shabaab is one of these groups.
  • Ethiopian forces withdrew in 2009 after militants gain control of most of southern Somalia. Al Shaabab aims to impose Sharia, or strict Islamic law, on the entire country and remove foreign influence – starting with the TFG, against whom the group declares war.
  • In February 2010, the al Shaabab officially announces its allegiance to al Qaeda. The latter has sent fighters to Somalia to train young radical Somalis how to fight and commit acts of terrorism.
  • Al Shaabab has declared an all-out war against the TFG. More than 1.4 million Somalis are displaced, while more than 200,000 have died due to conflict since 1991.

 

Afghanistan
  • From 1979 to 1989, Afghanistan was occupied by Soviet troops seeking to expand the U.S.S.R.’s empire to south-central Asia. The United States began covertly supplying weapons and ammunition to Afghan rebels, the mujahedeen, battling the Russians. The Soviet army was finally forced to withdraw in 1989, in large part thanks to U.S. support of the Afghan rebels, many whom later form the Taliban and provide Osama bin Laden the base for al Qaeda.
  • Once the Soviet army departs and U.S. interest in the region wanes, a series of coups rock Afghanistan as different tribes vie for power. The country is poverty-stricken, devastated by the Soviet occupation.
  • By 1996, the Taliban has consolidated control of most of Afghanistan, imposing strict Islamic law and vowing to expel all foreign influence. The group rules with an iron hand but restores some semblance of order to Afghanistan. The Taliban is friendly with the global terrorist network al Qaeda and allows it to set up training camps within its borders.
  • Pakistan, Afghanistan’s neighbor, recognizes the Taliban. Its Inter-Services Intelligence agency provides monetary and political support to al Qaeda, thinking to use the militant Islamist organization as a proxy to defend itself against India if need be.
  • In 2001, NATO forces invaded Afghanistan to dismantle the Taliban regime and eliminate al Qaeda training camps. An interim government was established until elections were held 2004. Taliban militants and Al Qaeda operatives continue to fight coalition forces and oppose the Afghan government.

-Carolina Chacon, National Conflicts of Concern Education Coordinator

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