This week’s conflict update covers events since the beginning of 2019 in STAND’s key focus areas: Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Yemen, Syria, Burma, and the escalating crisis in Venezuela. We are thankful to STAND Action Committee members Grace Harris and Maya Ungar, as well as STAND Managing Committee members, Grace Fernandes, Isabel Wolfer, Hannah King, Vishwa Padigepati, Caroline Mendoza, and Zachary Gossett for researching and writing pieces of this brief.

Sudan and South Sudan

Sudan

Weekly protests every Thursday calling for the end of the al-Bashir regime continue as they enter their fourth month. These peaceful protests, which originally began in December to protest the rising costs of basic goods and shortages of fuel, have resulted in dozens of civilians killed, hundreds injured, and thousands detained as Sudanese security forces responded with extreme force, including tear gas, batons, and ammunition. The Sudanese Professionals Associations (SPA), one of the primary groups coordinating the marches, named the demonstration on March 21 the “Procession for Justice” as a memorial for war crimes committed by the government. Although the government has reduced the excessive use of force against demonstrators, between 30 and 50 protesters have been killed since December 2018.

On February 22, President Omar al-Bashir declared a yearlong State of Emergency in an effort to quell the protests. The legislature has since cut this to six months. Earlier this month, Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes in Darfur, delegated leadership of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) to Ahmed Harun, who is also wanted by the ICC for war crimes in Darfur.

Earlier this month, an emergency court sent eight people to prison for participation in anti-government protests. The Democratic Lawyers Alliance, a group supporting the protests, reported that at least 870 protesters were brought before these emergency courts that were established due to al-Bashir’s declaration of a national emergency.

Interested in learning more about current events in Sudan and how you can support peaceful demonstrators? Join our webinar on Thursday, March 28 at 7 PM EST – click here to register!

South Sudan

Violence in South Sudan continues despite the peace deal signed by President Salva Kiir and rebel leader and former Vice President Riek Machar last fall. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, stated last month that the peace agreement has done little to deliver immediate improvement for civilians or enhance accountability measures, noting an increase in arbitrary detention, torture, execution, and gender-based violence. Notably, more than 10,000 people have been displaced since January due to violent clashes between government forces and armed groups. Violence has been particularly severe in Central Equatoria State, where the National Salvation Front has clashed with the government army. Thousands of refugees displaced by this unrest have fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past eight weeks. A UN report released last week concluded that South Sudan’s population is the least happy in Africa.

In late March, an almost $185 million spending deal was approved by the transitional government. This decision sparked criticism from observers claiming that the peace deal continues to suffer from a lack of funds due to corruption. Last December, the government allegedly authorized over $135,000 to renovate private residences owned by First Vice President Taban Deng Gai and the late revolutionary leader John Garang. Experts have expressed concern over an increasing lack of financial transparency among government officials and warned that international donors may not contribute to the depleting transition fund as consequence.

Great Lakes of Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Controversy surrounded the long-awaited DRC elections in December 2018. In addition to internet and text messaging shutdowns, signal cuts of Radio France Internationale, and voter intimidation and coercion, voting was postponed for voters in three opposition areas, restricting voting for over a million Congolese citizens. Over 1,000 polling stations in Kinshasa were closed due problems with voting machines and voter lists, and election observers were unable to access many polling stations and vote tabulation centers. In the wake of these events, at least 10 people were killed and dozens wounded by security forces during protests against the victory of Félix Tshisekedi. Notably, the Catholic Church, one of the most trusted institutions in the country, leaked results based off of their voter observation efforts that Martin Fayulu, another opposition candidate, had won by a landslide. Fayulu has challenged the results in court, but to no avail.

Concurrently, Congo has suffered a grave Ebola epidemic which has exceeded 1,000 cases, making it the world’s second worst outbreak. Due to ongoing conflict in Eastern DRC, there is great deal of public mistrust when it comes to treatment of the disease, and armed groups have staged attacks on ebola treatment centers, inhibiting the response of health workers. Just last week, two Médecins Sans Frontières treatment centers were set on fire in such attacks, forcing them to suspend operations in these areas. According to UNICEF statistics, children represent a third of ebola victims, and women, who often serve as primary caretakers of sick children, have also been disproportionately affected.

On March 14, DRC held Senate elections in which former President Joseph Kabila’s party, the Common Front for Congo, won the majority of  seats while Tshisekedi’s party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, won only 3 out of 100. There is evidence of at least 20 candidates who withdrew from races due to voter bribery efforts by provincial assembly members. As such, Tshisekedi has not allowed the newly-elected senators to take office, pending an investigation, and has indefinitely suspended the gubernatorial elections that were scheduled for next week.

Middle East

Yemen

At the end of 2018, there was cautious optimism for the situation in Yemen as the warring parties met in Sweden for peace talks. They agreed to a ceasefire in the strategic port city of Hodeidah, as well as a prisoner exchange. However, the condition of ordinary Yemenis remains bleak, with 80% living in poverty and 110,000 suspected cases of cholera. Since the war began, the World Bank estimates that 35% of businesses have closed, with household income plummeting due to inflation and currency devaluation. While the ceasefire has lead to short respites from violence, civilian deaths remain high and both parties blame the other for violations. The agreed-upon prisoner exchange has yet to occur and relatives of those imprisoned are calling for the parties to uphold the agreement. The continuation of peace talks has been delayed and some say time is running out. Additionally, some from southern Yemen are threatening a new conflict if they are not included in the talks. There have been calls for independence in southern Yemen since the unification of Yemen in the 1990s, as the ruling north has sidelined local economic and political concerns.

The United Nations is seeking $4.2 billion for the continuation of humanitarian work over the next year. Last month, they regained access to the Red Sea Mills, a food storage center pivotal to efficient food distribution in the region. Despite their active involvement in the war, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pledged $2.6 billion dollars to fund the UN humanitarian plan for Yemen. However, the full funding goal is, as of now, unmet.

In the United States, the House and Senate voted this year to end assistance to Saudi Arabia’s efforts in Yemen, each passing a version of the War Powers Resolution. However, since the language is not identical, the House must vote on the Senate version before being sent to the White House to be signed into law. President Trump has threatened to veto this legislation if passed.

Syria

As Syria enters the ninth year of civil war, Syria’s refugees and internally displaced peoples have suffered another harsh winter. Over 37 internally displaced children were frozen to death, both in Rukban Camp, and fleeing from Hajin, an ISIS-held bastion further north. In late January 2019, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey revived the idea of creating safe zones along Turkey’s border to protect civilians. Concerns remain as to whether refugees may be forcibly returned as a result, and how safe zones would affect Kurdish civilians. Turkey has long has tensions with the Kurdish people, who have long fought for political autonomy in Turkey and throughout the Middle East. Since the beginning of the conflict, over half of the country’s pre-war population has been displaced, with 5.6 million people living as refugees and 6.2 million people displaced internally. Half of those affected are children.

On March 23, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces announced a military victory over the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS), who once held a third of Syria and Iraq’s territory. Following this victory, the top military commander in Syria’s Kurdish territory, who led anti-ISIL efforts, urged President Bashar al-Assad to pursue dialogue and in order to reach a political solution towards an autonomous Kurdish region. In response to the announcement of the defeat of the ISIL, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany said they would remain vigilant of the group’s “sleeper cells” that still pose terrorist threats. Amongst military strategists, concerns remain that victory will be fleeting, and that ISIS will regroup once troop withdrawals are complete.

Southeast Asia

Burma

Content Warning: This section describes sex trafficking and sexual violence.

The situation of the Rohingya has continued to worsen in 2019. The Rohingya, a primarily-Muslim ethnic and religious minority group, have long been persecuted by the Burmese government. Since August 2017, thousands have been killed, driving hundreds of thousands across the border to Bangladesh, sparking international outrage and leading to the creation of the largest refugee camp in the world. Overcrowding in the camps has led to further problems. Bangladesh, already a very poor country, has struggled to handle the influx of refugees, and are seeking to move Rohingya refugees to an island in the Bay of Bengal. This island is remote, frequently hit by cyclones, and is considered uninhabitable. Experts worry that this forced movement will lead to further problems for the vulnerable Rohingya population.

Conflict continues against ethnic minorities due to Burmese military activity in the Kachin and Shan states. These conflicts have increased the vulnerability for exploitation of Kachin and Shan women. While men fight, women must take increasingly risky job opportunities to support their families, some of which lead to human trafficking. A massively incriminating report released by Human Rights Watch last week uncovered the human trafficking of Kachin women forced to become wives in China. Originally promised jobs in China, these women discover upon arrival that they were instead sold to Chinese families. They are locked away and repeatedly raped until they become pregnant. After having a child, the women either remain as sex slaves or are returned to their families, sometimes after years of abuse.

Emerging Crises

Venezuela

The Venezuela crisis began in January when the opposition-led National Assembly declared Juan Guaidó the interim president of the country. For years, Venezuela has suffered from hyperinflation, food shortages, and increasingly totalitarian policies at the hands of Nicolás Maduro’s government. While the U.S. and the majority of the EU and Organization of American States support Guaidó, Russia and Cuba, long-time Maduro allies, continue to support the current government.

Early on March 21, Venezuelan authorities apprehended Guaidó’s chief of staff, Robert Marrero, marking a significant escalation in the political crisis. His arrest mirrors similar crackdowns on dissent by Maduro’s government. Venezuelan doctors also face government pressure after attempting to alert the UN to the dire shortage of essential medicines. Michelle Bachelet, the UN Human Rights Chief, has criticized both the Maduro regime for cracking down on dissent, and US sanctions for exacerbating the conflict.

The US claims that these sanctions are meant to target government activities alone, yet many argue that they are hurting the most vulnerable Venezuelans. Along with sanctions, the US has increased intelligence sharing in the region, providing information to Colombian authorities about insurgents who have been strengthened due to the Venezuela conflict. While unconfirmed, experts speculate that Maduro is allowing insurgent activity in order to prepare for possible military intervention. If true, these actions would simply be the latest example of the Maduro administration’s transgressions.

Recent US-Russia talks over Venezuela have stalled due to the differing visions of Maduro’s role in the nation, and on Monday, Russia landed two military planes in the country, a move the U.S. denounced as a “contradiction of both Nicolas Maduro’s and Russia’s calls for non-intervention […] [and] a reckless escalation of the situation.”

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Grace Harris, who contributed to the Sudan section of this brief, is a sophomore at Tampa Preparatory School in Florida, where she serves as the president of her STAND chapter. She joined STAND after learning about the Darfur genocide in my World History 1 class during her Freshman year, seeking an opportunity to take action and make a difference in the world. In addition to leading STAND at Tampa Prep, Grace serves on STAND national’s Sudan and Yemen Action Committees.

Isabel Wolfer, who contributed to the South Sudan section of this brief, is STAND’s Communications Coordinator and a member of the Sudan Working Group. She is a senior at The George Washington University in Washington, DC and a former intern for the Darfur Women Action Group.

Hannah King and Vishwa Padigepati, who contributed to the Yemen section of this brief, are members of STAND’s Managing Committee and the Yemen Action Committee. Hannah is STAND’s Campaigns Coordinator and a senior at Clark University in Massachusetts and Vishwa is STAND’s Advocacy Coordinator and a student at Fairmont Preparatory Academy in California.

Maya Ungar, who contributed to the Burma section of this brief, is a junior at the University of Arkansas and is serving as STAND’s Southeast Asia Coordinator for the 2018-2019 academic year. She is currently studying abroad in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Grace Fernandes, who contributed to the DRC section of this brief, is a junior at Simmons University in Boston, Massachusetts, and one of STAND’s Student Co-Directors. She leads STAND’s Indigenous Peoples Action Committee.

Caroline Mendoza, who contributed to the Syria section of this brief, is a junior at Cerritos High School in California, and serves on the STAND Outreach Team. She is a member of the Burma and Yemen Action Committees.

Zachary Gossett, who contributed to the Venezuela section of this brief, is a sophomore at Butler University and a member of STAND’s Outreach Team, He serves on the Indigenous Peoples and Burma Action Committees.

“[ISIS forces] have called for the systematic destruction of the entire Yezidi people, which would constitute genocide […] when we have the unique capabilities to help avert a massacre, then I believe the United States of America cannot turn a blind eye. We can act, carefully and responsibly, to prevent a potential act of genocide.”

The actions taken to relieve the Yezidis besieged by ISIS on Mt. Sinjar eventually allowed thousands of men, women and children without food and water to flee the mountain. Their homes had been obliterated and their cultural heritage ransacked by ISIS fighters.  

However, the 2014 campaign against Yezidis was not the first act of genocidal violence perpetrated against the community. The campaign also failed to absolve the US of its role in inadvertently providing an atmosphere conducive to ethnic cleansing and genocidal violence. The combination of Saddam Hussein’s brutality and the dreadful miscalculations made by American and British policymakers and the former dictator intensified the collapse of the Iraqi state. Equally, the neglect of minority communities in Iraq shown by successive administrations, combined with the dysfunctional government set up by Washington in Baghdad in the post-Saddam era, allowed violence to escalate against the Yezidis.

The Yezidi faith, like the Mandaean one, is a religion shrouded in secrecy by its clergy; it is a monotheist religion that incorporates several elements of the Christian, Zoroastrian, and Islamic faiths. To extremists cells such as Al-Qa’ida and ISIS, Yezidis are regarded as “devil worshippers” for their worship of Melek Taus, “the Peacock Angel” sometimes referred to as Shaytan, and which the Qu’ran calls Satan. The Yezidis’ concern with religious purity and honor also created practical problems for their integration in the region. In a region where honor killings and tribal

politics still hold considerable sway, Yezidi taboos and religious rules have come into conflict with other Iraqi communities and other tribes. This conflict was recently exemplified by the honor killing of Du’a where her Yezidi tribe stoned her to death for eloping with a Sunni Muslim. Clearly, honor killings are not a phenomenon purely linked to extremist cells such as ISIS, Al-Qa’ida and regimes such as Iran or Saudi Arabia.

The persecution of the Yezidis is not a recent phenomenon in Iraq. The historian Geraldine Chatelard has argued that most general historical works on modern Iraq fail to mention that “episodes of mass-displacement or forced migration…of political opponents such as the Yezidis is a trend that dates back to the mandate era” and Ottoman Empire. According to British diplomat Gerard Russell, the Yezidis “keep a list of seventy-two persecutions which they have been subjected to over the centuries.”

The Yezidis’ history has been punctuated by persecution at the hands of the Muslim majority in Iraq, while in modern times perpetual war in Iraq has continued to deal the Yezidi people a cruel hand. While Kurds were prioritized in American policymaking narratives during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Yezidis were not mentioned even when entire Yezidi districts were targeted by Saddam’s Arabization programmes in 1965 and between 1973-1975. The Yezidis refused to be incorporated into the Iraqi state as defined by the Ba’athist Party, a state formed along the lines of ethnicity. Resistance against these draconian programmes, violent and non-violent, culminated in genocide against the Kurdish and Yezidi communities during the Al-Anfal campaign in northern Iraq (1986-1989) as Saddam’s cousin Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid pacified the rebellious provinces.

The consequences facing the Yezidis for rejecting the Ba’athist regime’s doctrine were severe. According to Human Rights Watch, these included resettlement, ethnic cleansing, and the en-masse disappearance of Yezidi men who were abducted and executed by military intelligence. As anti-genocide advocate and former US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Powers argues, these minorities, like the Kurds, were ignored by both the Reagan and H.W. Bush administrations. James Baker, the US Secretary of State under Bush, stated that “shifting a policy away from cooperation

towards confrontation is a difficult proposition when support for a “policy of engagement” with Saddam Hussein’s government is fiercely embedded.”

Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq War was a highly profitable enterprise for the West, the Soviet Union, regional powers, and businesses alike. Funnelling armaments, including chemical weapons, into Saddam’s military arsenal to contain the Islamic regime, meant ignoring the appalling genocidal violence being conducted against civilians in Iraq. In the 1980s, US policymakers and journalists treated Saddam’s genocide against the Kurds and Yezidis as a product of war rather than as a genocidal campaign, despite the methodical nature in which villages were collectivized, systematic slaughter was conducted within designated “prohibited zones,” and chemical weapons were used against the Kurds and other minorities, including the Yezidis and Turkmen. In some respects, these actions exceeded the recent violence of ISIS.

This legacy of overlooking the brutalization of Yezidi communities by Saddam escalated after the deposition of the police state by George W. Bush’s administration. Washington and London’s miscalculations during the occupation of Iraq, rather than safeguarding the basic human rights of minorities, exacerbated their plight and exodus from Iraq.

During the occupation, significant intercommunal violence spilled over into open civil war (2006-2007) across Iraq. Several hundred miles to the southeast of the Yezidi communities, the capital of Iraq, Baghdad, was ripped apart by Shi’a and Sunni death squads conducting pogroms against their respective religious sects as American soldiers, supported by Iraqi Security Forces, continued their counterinsurgency operations against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq and affiliated jihadist cells. The Yezidis were eventually drawn into this violence as the impact of Baghdad’s civil war rippled across the shredded Iraqi state.

On April 22, 2007 a bus making its way from Mosul’s Textile Factory to the town of Bashika to drop off factory workers to their homes was ordered to pull over by armed men. They boarded the bus and checked cards for identification. Upon completion, all passengers, with the exception of twenty-three of Yezidi men, were driven deep into the city as the convoy accompanying them pulled over in northern Mosul. Within minutes, they were ordered off the bus, lined up against the wall, and shot. The convoy of gunmen departed, leaving the bodies of the men in the street riddled with bullets and the wall spattered with their blood.

According to the international media, the murders were acts of retribution against the Yezidis after an incident in the town of Bashika twenty-five kilometres north of Mosul weeks earlier. Situated in tranquil hills and surrounded by lush olive groves, the town was a popular destination for Mosul residents to retreat from the bustle of the city for family picnics and to escape from the tumult of the city. Under the American occupation, Bashika had remained relatively stable despite the vicious civil war gripping the rest of the country; there, Yezidi temples, Muslim mosques and Christian churches stood in close proximity, presenting a rare image of tolerant coexistence. The town’s quiet nature in many ways epitomized the subtle richness and cultural diversity that came to define Ninewa’s province over centuries of history.

However, the grisly stoning of Du’a  stoked a blood-feud, one fed by the propaganda of the most brutal factions of the Iraq War. As Du’a’s stoning went viral, Islamist extremists smeared the reputation of Bashika, a predominantly Yezidi town, and caught the attention of the international media. By this stage, tit-for-tat killings, executions and kidnappings had become a norm in post-Saddam Iraq. This violence between the Yezidis and Sunnis underscores the sharpening divide between minority groups and Islamist Sunnis and Shiites. These developments were ignored as Petraeus’ decision to secure the streets of Baghdad and to reopen space for political coordination between Iraq’s three main sects (the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Kurds) took priority. This move obscured the urgent threats facing minorities across the country.

With intermittent violence occurring daily alongside a counterinsurgency campaign, the stage was set for a devastating attack. While ISIS operatives were retreating, Sunni insurgents moved to occupy territories in the borderlands between Ninewa in Iraq and the Syrian provinces of Deir ez-Zor and al-Hasakah northwest of Iraq. These locations, ‘strips of the most impoverished and sparsely populated parts of Iraq and Syria,’ were the easiest places to escape US and ISF soldiers.

The territories of thousands of secular and religiously tolerant groups in the province were unprotected. For extremist cells, these groups presented an opportunity to foment sectarian violence and execute attacks against Ninewa’s soft underbelly. As Iraq’s most diverse province, dotted by perceived “devil worshippers,” “heretics,” and “infidels,” the minorities were soft targets for Al-Qa’ida cells. The increasing tensions between Yezidis and hardline Sunni Islamists had created an atmosphere that the terrorist organisation could exploit despite setbacks against the American occupation and Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. The Americans’ withdrawal from the region left minority groups vulnerable to attack, and jihadists were determined to take advantage of the security void left by the Americans.

On August 14, 2007 several trucks, each laced with 27,000 kilograms of explosives, destroyed the Yezidi villages of Kahtaniya and Jazeera. The coordinated suicide attacks killed over 800 men, women, and children, and wounded thousands more. The bombings by Al-Qa’ida in Iraq against the Yezidi communities in Kahtaniya and Jazeera were the second deadliest acts of terrorism in modern history behind the September 11 attacks in the United States.

Still, the acts of terror in Kahtaniya and Jazeera never gained the traction needed to highlight the plight of the Yezidis. The mass slaughter, while initially shocking, did not gain media coverage across the Western world. The massacre blended with news of other attacks as just another bombing in Iraq. Improvised Explosive Devices and Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices had swiftly become a deadly normality for Coalition soldiers and Iraqi civilians. To American policymakers, Kahtaniya and Jazeera was a blip in their “successful” surge. General Petraeus was determined to sell a disastrous war as an unqualified success, stating twenty-four days after the mass slaughter: “To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqis elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens.”

In the shattered villages of Kahtaniya and Jazeera, Yezidi communities spoke not of peace, but of impending extermination by extremist cells such Al-Qa’ida in Iraq. “Their aim is to annihilate us, to create trouble and kill all Yezidis because we are not Muslims” explained one villager from Kahtaniya. Another villager stated bluntly: “Another bombing like this and there will be no more Yezidis left.” Their warnings and pleas—wedded to the dissemination of leaflets and the spread of hate speech branding Yezidis as infidels, heretics, and outlaws—were ignored, resulting in dire consequences for the religious community and other minorities in Ninewa. Following the end of the American occupation and withdrawal of soldiers, the Mas‘ud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Peshmerga militia were unable to stop attacks launched against Yezidis living outside of the established security zone by Sunni militants.

Seven years later, Al-Qa’ida in Iraq reemerged in northern Iraq, cutting a swathe through Syria and Iraq as ISIS, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and former leaders of Saddam’s military. The Peshmerga, facing military defeat, fell back, with dire consequences for the Yezidis. ISIS’s project, founded upon the ultra-violent doctrine of Abu Bakr Naji “The Management of Savagery,” sought to “purify” Iraq and cleanse it of “apostates” and “heretics.” Shiites, Yezidis, Christians, and those who refused to pay jizya, a tax historically levied on non-Muslim subjects, faced a brutal ultimatum: leave or die.

ISIS evolved into a vicious regional faction. The factions were strengthened by strong cross-border ties with Sunni tribes in Syria and Iraq, the instability created by the Syrian War, the targeting of Sunni politicians, and the political alienation of the Sunni population by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In this context, Baghdadi and his puritanical fighters decided they would cleanse Ninewa of its ethnic and religious minorities by conducting systematic rape, torture, abduction and harrowing violence against the Yezidis and other minorities.

In August 2014, in the shadow of Mount Sinjar, ISIS militants rounded up and massacred Yezidi men and boys in Sinjar and the surrounding villages of Kocho, Qiniyeh, Jadali, and Jazeera. Yezidis who refused to pledge loyalty to Baghdadi and convert to Islam were executed at roadsides and prison centres. Along the roadsides, those fleeing for Mt. Sinjar were intercepted by ISIS vehicles. Yezidi women and children were abducted in the hundreds as personal prizes for jihadist fighters and subjected to sexual abuse, forced marriages to fighters, or sexual slavery. Others were sold to traffickers whose trade had flourished since the collapse of the Iraqi state in 2003, resulting in increasingly porous borders. In the wake of the cleaning operations, 830,000 people were displaced, the entire Yezidi population in Iraq uprooted, and 40,000-50,000 fled to Mt. Sinjar, historically a place of refuge for the community during conflict.

In a nutshell, the horrific violence between the Yezidi and Sunni communities encapsulates the brutalization of Iraqi society, culture, and politics by decades of ceaseless conflict, external intervention, and brutal authoritarian rule. In equal measure, it perfectly summarizes the grave amnesia of the great powers playing geopolitics in the Middle East, whose illusions of control have stood in contrast to decades of conflict and its impact on the region and its minority communities. The decline of the Yezidi population to less than one million is a microcosm of this appalling tragedy.

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Matthew C. K. Williams is a British freelance journalist with a MA degree in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Matthew has written for various NGOs and papers including Amnesty International, Strife, Aegis Trust, The Scottish Times and Osservatorio Mashrek. His current work for The Conflict Archives is focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq War, and insurgency across the Greater Middle East.”

One of the themes of the book is repetitive disappointment. Time and time again, humans worldwide have fallen victim to heinous crimes that were committed without much international resistance. Atrocities were allowed to proceed in Cambodia, Iraq, and Bosnia (among other places) for many reasons, not the least of which was political convenience.

In most cases, perpetrators of genocide, atrocities, and chemical weapons attacks conducted these acts with the knowledge that the world had neither the willpower nor the mechanisms to deliver justice. In almost all cases, we were reluctant to believe, slow to listen, late to mobilize, and horrified by the magnitude of suffering that had occurred. Our world has changed immeasurably since politically uncomfortable reports of Iraqi chemical weapons attacks on Iranian soldiers and Iraqi Kurds fell on unlistening ears in the late ‘80s. If it happened today, we wouldn’t just listen – we would act. Wouldn’t we?

The conflict in Syria has been riddled by allegations of chemical weapons attacks by the Assad regime since at least late 2012. A cursory Google search of allegations unearths a Wikipedia page dedicated to the use of chemical weapons in Syria which notes almost 60 incidents where chemical weapons were reported as being used. Although UN investigators actually responded to allegations with a report in a somewhat timely manner (compared to Iraq in the 80s), the investigators were careful not to assign blame to any party – even when it was determined that missiles carrying chemical weapons were launched from government-controlled territory.

Any form of military intervention in Syria was avoided when the Syrian government agreed to eliminate its entire chemical weapon stockpile. I have issues with what seems to be the conceptual equivalent of a murderer avoiding jail time by turning in his gun, but at least it was progress. Almost a year ago to date, Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile was announced to be completely destroyed. Of course, there were always suspicions that the Assad regime was hiding undeclared caches of chemicals, but at least it was progress.

Marking the success, President Obama commented the collective “we” had sent “a clear message that the use of these abhorrent weapons has consequences and will not be tolerated by the international community.” But really, were the consequences so severe?

The Assad regime seems to think not. In early May, US officials accused the regime of continued use of chlorine gas on civilians. In July, The Wall Street Journal published a story headlined “Mission to Purge Syria of Chemical Weapons Comes Up Short”, which was exactly what it sounds like. Two weeks ago, the UN adopted a measure to finally identify the party(s) responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. Even after perpetrators are officially identified after years of essentially unimpeded use, prosecution could be “years or more than a decade away.” It doesn’t take an expert to see the similarities between the atrocities occurring and Syria and those that occurred in Iraq, Bosnia, and many other places before.

I think there is value in reflecting on the failures of our conventions and red lines, just as there is value in considering that we are likely underestimating the number of casualties caused by chemical weapons in Syria – just as we have in conflicts before. In “A Problem From Hell” (2002), Ambassador Power notes her fear that the “Kosovo intervention and the Milosevic trial, once thought to mark important precedents, may come to represent high-water marks in genocide prevention and punishment”. Thirteen years later, the water level is mostly unchanged. We have grown better at believing (mostly), and the international community does a whole lot of listening now. Still, that’s not enough.

We have the evidence, and we have the responsibility to act on it. If we choose to forget past lessons and drag our feet even more in Syria, we’ll again be horrified by the magnitude of suffering we inevitably uncover.