Sudan

In the two months since the fall of Omar al-Bashir, demands for civilian rule have been brutally denied by the military generals ruling Sudan. After weeks of protests, a military crackdown in early June has left at least 118 killed and 784 wounded by security forces. Eyewitnesses have reported militiamen hurling corpses into the Nile, some with cement bricks tied to their limbs to keep the bodies from floating. Militiamen have used tear gas, whips, and sticks to beat men and women alike, and have burned tents at the sit-in site, many with people still inside. Systematic rapes of both protesters and doctors have also been reported.

In response to the crackdown, demonstrators have decried the current ruling elites as holdovers from al-Bashir’s regime, initiating a civil disobedience campaign on June 9. Mass strikes have shut down businesses and public entities across Khartoum, and the government has held essential employees at gunpoint to force them to work. The Sudanese Professional Association, one of the groups that led the protest movement which forced al-Bashir out of power, has also urged international financial institutions to boycott the military government. The U.N. called for a monitoring team to be deployed to Sudan and the U.S. State Department condemned the crackdown, echoing demands for a transition to a civilian government. The African Union has suspended Sudan’s membership until a civilian government is put in place. For STAND’s latest on the Sudan crisis and its connections to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, see our recent blog post here.

South Sudan

On Friday, May 3, the conflicting parties led by South Sudan President Salva Kiir and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO) leader Riek Machar met and agreed to delay the formation of a united, power-sharing government for six months. While Machar, who fled in 2016 following a previous peace deal collapse, wanted a six-month delay to resolve security issues that have prevented his return to Juba, Kiir wanted to focus on forming the joint administration. A week later, Kiir declared that the formation of this unified government should be delayed by at least a year, stating that so far his administration has been unable to fully disarm and train all of the various forces formerly fighting in South Sudan and citing difficulties due to the upcoming rainy season.

This comes a month after South Sudan’s government hired lobbyists from Gainful Solutions, a California-based lobbyist organization, to persuade the U.S. government to reverse current sanctions on South Sudan and to delay and block establishment of a hybrid court that would try those accused of war crimes in South Sudan. While complaining about the costs of peace agreement implementation, it paid $3.7 million to the firm.

Citing corruption, human rights abuses, and fears that a united government will never be formed, youth activist groups called for demonstrations on May 15 to protest the Kiir administration, concerned that the delay would simply punt the same problems down the line. In response, South Sudanese troops were sent to prevent these protests, fearing that they could result in Kiir’s ouster.

Great Lakes of Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

In the second worst ebola epidemic on record, DRC’s outbreak has surpassed 2,000 reported cases, over half of which have resulted in deaths, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). In the past two months alone, the reported number cases doubled. The outbreak shows little sign of containment. On June 11, the first cross-border case was reported in Uganda. The infected five-year-old boy died after he and his family entered Uganda on June 9. Since the announcement, three more cases have been confirmed in Uganda. The cross-border spread could incite a renewed push for declaration of the ebola outbreak as a global emergency.

The rapid rise in ebola cases coincides with dramatic intensification of violence in the region. Intermittent violence driven by politics, money, and regional insecurity have afflicted DRC’s North Kivu and Ituri provinces, the center of the ebola outbreak, for over two decades. Historically, civilians have served as targets for both state and non-state actors, leaving communities with a strong distrust for authorities. Thus, rumors claiming ebola as a hoax, or caused by the government and health workers, are easily accepted. This mistrust has made emergency response efforts ineffective.

Additionally, attacks on treatment centers have become more frequent, leading organizations like Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) to pull out. Attacks have been blamed by the government on local militias who often work on behalf of political sponsors and foreign bidders. In a June 3 statement, ISIS claimed responsibility for sponsoring a deadly attack in Beni—and not for the first time. Other attacks are tied to political tensions from the presidential elections. Leaflets left by attackers at treatment centers justify attacks with the exclusion of 1.2 million voters due to stated concerns of the Ebola outbreak.  

On May 20, President Tshisekedi announced Sylvestre Ilunga Ilukamba, an ally of former president Kabila, as prime minister. The position holds a substantial amount of power, confirming that Kabila has not left the political scene (nor has he left the presidential villa). Despite evidence of fraudulent elections and growing disapproval of the Tshisekedi-Kabila alliance, there is still hope for political change. Since taking office, Tshisekedi has pardoned over 700 political prisoners, opposition leader Moise Katumbi has returned from exile, and the late opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi was finally buried on May 30, two years after his death.

Middle East

Yemen

The conflict in Yemen has intensified in recent weeks with an increase in Houthi actions against the Saudi coalition. In response to Saudi escalation of air raids on the Houthi in Hajjah, a northern Yemeni province, Houthi forces have begun to target the kingdom increasingly with drone and missile attacks. There has also been an upswing in cholera cases in the third major outbreak since 2015. The spread of the disease has been exacerbated due to the war: many Yemenis are forced to drink dirty water, a major cause of cholera, as water resources have become scarce. Due to restrictions on imports over the past few years, it has become increasingly difficult for patients and medical professionals to have access to life-saving medicines which would otherwise be inexpensive and easy to access.

Following the U.S. Senate’s failed attempt to override Trump’s veto of the Yemen War Powers Resolution, a measure to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, on May 24, President Trump declared a national security emergency in order to waive Congressional review of $8.1 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan. Pompeo cited tensions with Iran as the reason for the declaration. He stated that a delay in the sale could increase the risk of losing U.S. allies at a time of instability caused by Iran. In response, a bipartisan group of senators plan to introduce 22 separate resolutions of disapproval: one for each of the 22 weapons sales. This effort is intended to reassert Congress’ role of approving arms deals to foreign governments. In a related effort, Senators Chris Murphy and Todd Young have announced that they will introduce a bill to force a vote on the U.S.-Saudi relationship.  Their bill will invoke the Foreign Assistance Act, requesting a report of Saudi human rights practices within a 30-day window. After receipt of the report, Congress can force a vote on U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia.

Syria

The last significant rebel stronghold in Syria, the northwestern province of Idlib has become the focus of a bombing campaign led by Russian and Syrian forces. The campaign has targeted over 25 health facilities and 35 schools. In the month of May alone, nearly 270,000 people were displaced and over 300 killed as a result of the bombardment.

In the southwestern city of Dara’a, more than 380 civilians have been arrested and 11 killed since the city fell to the Syrian army in July 2018. Despite the government’s promise to implement “reconciliation” agreements, the city has been a place of targeted killings, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests. Hundreds remain detained for unknown reasons in a move by the Assad government to reassert control and smother resistance in the region. In Syria at large, over 2,400 are being held in prisons, where thousands are believed to have perished due to poor treatment or torture.

Southeast Asia

Burma

On May 27, 2019, the Burmese government released seven soldiers who were jailed for the killing of 10 Rohingya in 2017, serving less than a year in what was supposed to be a ten-year prison sentence. Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, Reuters reporters who gained international attention after being jailed for their investigation of Burma’s violence towards the Rohingya, were freed on May 7th after serving 500 days in prison. In mid-May, the World Bank announced plans to implement a $100 million development project in Burma to support small businesses and increase employment in impoverished areas of the country. Because of existing barriers that some rights groups liken to South African apartheid, human rights groups have expressed concerns that the project could end up being counterproductive if underlying social tensions remain unaddressed — which is likely if, as is proposed, the Burmese government decides how to allocate the funds.

In late May, Amnesty International conducted an investigation in Rakhine state, confirming that violence, war crimes, and human rights abuses are continuing against the state’s varying ethnic groups. The reports that ethnic Rakhine, Mro, Rohingya, and Khami villagers are living in conflict zones, in addition to newly-found evidence that the military is pursuing the destruction of ancient temple complexes in Mrauk-U. After being first reported on in March, the trafficking of women from Burma’s Kachin and Shan states has become increasingly dire. Kachin women have been continuously sold to China due to the country’s scarcity of women, and the issue has gone largely unrecognized with little to no action from Burma’s or China’s law enforcement.

Emerging Crises

Venezuela

Venezuela is mired in a major political crisis as the struggle for power intensifies between incumbent President Maduro and the leader of the opposition, Juan Guaidó. The 2018 elections remain contested, as numerous opposition candidates were barred from running and Venezuela’s Supreme Court carried out the legal indictment of National Assembly members. In January 2019, the National Assembly, led mostly by parties opposed to Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela, declared Guaidó the interim president of the country.

The international community is now split between those who have withdrawn recognition of Maduro’s government (including the U.S., Canada, the Organization of American States, and the majority of E.U. members), and those who view the Maduro government as legitimate (including Russia, China, and Iran). In the midst of the political unrest, the conflict also harbors a massive humanitarian crisis, as the 1.3 million % inflation rate, medical crisis, and food shortages cause millions of Venezuelans to flee.

In April, the West solidified its stance against Maduro’s government, as the U.S. demanded that Maduro be held accountable for the humanitarian crisis. Canada joined by placing further sanctions against 43 members of Maduro’s government and freezing their assets. Red Cross and other humanitarian aid organizations have begun relief deliveries and services in the region. As oil sanctions from the West intensified mid-April, Venezuela increased oil sales to Russia. On April 19, Guaidó called for a nation-wide march against Maduro’s government, intensifying the military crackdown in the country.

Meanwhile, Maduro has increased his reliance on the military, continuing to praise their ‘total loyalty’ and their importance in preserving Venezuelan leadership. Pro-Maduro countries such as Turkey and Russia accused Guaidó’s party of resorting to violence. As rallies against the Maduro regime have intensified, Brazilian and Lima Group intelligence have suggested that there are fractions in the military which could lead to the regime’s collapse. Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have called for the ICC to investigate crimes against humanity in Venezuela as the E.U. and the U.S. continue to condemn Venezuelan courts’ proceedings against opposition parties.

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Isabel Wolfer is a recent graduate of The George Washington University in Washington, DC, and is STAND’s outgoing Communications Coordinator. In addition to her work with STAND, Isabel has interned for the Darfur Women Action Group, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, and has been a Junior Resident Fellow at the Center for Khmer Studies in Siem Reap, Cambodia. Isabel contributed the Sudan portion of this update.

Grace Harris is an incoming junior at Tampa Preparatory School in Florida, where she serves as the president of her STAND chapter. She also serves on STAND national’s Sudan and Yemen Action Committees, and will be STAND’s State Advocacy Lead for Florida in the 2019-2020 academic year. Grace contributed the South Sudan portion of this update.

Megan Smith is a rising senior at the University of Southern California, where she will be working to reestablish a STAND chapter, and is an incoming member of STAND’s Managing Committee co-leading education and outreach. Previously, she has served on the Policy Task Force of STAND France during her junior year and as California State Advocacy Lead during her sophomore year. Outside of STAND, she interned at the nonprofits DigDeep (Los Angeles) and HAMAP-Humanitaire (Paris) and currently works at Dexis Consulting Group. Megan contributed the DRC portion of this update.

Yasmine Halmane is an incoming senior at Teaneck High School in New Jersey, where she is working to establish her school’s first STAND chapter. She also serves on STAND national’s Yemen and Sudan Action Committees. In addition to her work with STAND, Yasmine is also affiliated with Amnesty International US. Yasmine contributed the Yemen portion of this update.

Abby Edwards is a junior in the Dual BA program between Columbia University and Sciences Po Paris and serves on the STAND USA Managing Committee. Prior to this, Abby served on the Managing Committee of STAND France and worked as an intern for the Buchenwald Memorial, the Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies, and conducted research for the US Department of State – Office of the Historian. This summer, Abby will be conducting research on post-conflict education in Cambodia as a Junior Research Fellow with the Center for Khmer Studies. Abby contributed the Syria portion of this update.

Caroline Mendoza is a STAND Managing Committee member and an incoming senior at Cerritos High School in California. She and served as STAND’s 2018-2019 West Region Field Organizer, and on STAND’s Burma and Yemen Action Committees. In her free time, Caroline participates in Model United Nations, marching band, and Girl Scouts, and pursues Holocaust and genocide education. Caroline contributed the Burma portion of this update.

Vishwa Padigepati is an incoming first year student at Yale University, and a member of the STAND Managing Committee, as well as the Yemen and Sudan Action Committees. In addition to her work in STAND, she has interned for her State Senator and Congressional Representative and has done policy research on developmental infrastructure for Andhra Pradesh, India. Vishwa contributed the Venezuela portion of this update.

“[ISIS forces] have called for the systematic destruction of the entire Yezidi people, which would constitute genocide […] when we have the unique capabilities to help avert a massacre, then I believe the United States of America cannot turn a blind eye. We can act, carefully and responsibly, to prevent a potential act of genocide.”

The actions taken to relieve the Yezidis besieged by ISIS on Mt. Sinjar eventually allowed thousands of men, women and children without food and water to flee the mountain. Their homes had been obliterated and their cultural heritage ransacked by ISIS fighters.  

However, the 2014 campaign against Yezidis was not the first act of genocidal violence perpetrated against the community. The campaign also failed to absolve the US of its role in inadvertently providing an atmosphere conducive to ethnic cleansing and genocidal violence. The combination of Saddam Hussein’s brutality and the dreadful miscalculations made by American and British policymakers and the former dictator intensified the collapse of the Iraqi state. Equally, the neglect of minority communities in Iraq shown by successive administrations, combined with the dysfunctional government set up by Washington in Baghdad in the post-Saddam era, allowed violence to escalate against the Yezidis.

The Yezidi faith, like the Mandaean one, is a religion shrouded in secrecy by its clergy; it is a monotheist religion that incorporates several elements of the Christian, Zoroastrian, and Islamic faiths. To extremists cells such as Al-Qa’ida and ISIS, Yezidis are regarded as “devil worshippers” for their worship of Melek Taus, “the Peacock Angel” sometimes referred to as Shaytan, and which the Qu’ran calls Satan. The Yezidis’ concern with religious purity and honor also created practical problems for their integration in the region. In a region where honor killings and tribal

politics still hold considerable sway, Yezidi taboos and religious rules have come into conflict with other Iraqi communities and other tribes. This conflict was recently exemplified by the honor killing of Du’a where her Yezidi tribe stoned her to death for eloping with a Sunni Muslim. Clearly, honor killings are not a phenomenon purely linked to extremist cells such as ISIS, Al-Qa’ida and regimes such as Iran or Saudi Arabia.

The persecution of the Yezidis is not a recent phenomenon in Iraq. The historian Geraldine Chatelard has argued that most general historical works on modern Iraq fail to mention that “episodes of mass-displacement or forced migration…of political opponents such as the Yezidis is a trend that dates back to the mandate era” and Ottoman Empire. According to British diplomat Gerard Russell, the Yezidis “keep a list of seventy-two persecutions which they have been subjected to over the centuries.”

The Yezidis’ history has been punctuated by persecution at the hands of the Muslim majority in Iraq, while in modern times perpetual war in Iraq has continued to deal the Yezidi people a cruel hand. While Kurds were prioritized in American policymaking narratives during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Yezidis were not mentioned even when entire Yezidi districts were targeted by Saddam’s Arabization programmes in 1965 and between 1973-1975. The Yezidis refused to be incorporated into the Iraqi state as defined by the Ba’athist Party, a state formed along the lines of ethnicity. Resistance against these draconian programmes, violent and non-violent, culminated in genocide against the Kurdish and Yezidi communities during the Al-Anfal campaign in northern Iraq (1986-1989) as Saddam’s cousin Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid pacified the rebellious provinces.

The consequences facing the Yezidis for rejecting the Ba’athist regime’s doctrine were severe. According to Human Rights Watch, these included resettlement, ethnic cleansing, and the en-masse disappearance of Yezidi men who were abducted and executed by military intelligence. As anti-genocide advocate and former US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Powers argues, these minorities, like the Kurds, were ignored by both the Reagan and H.W. Bush administrations. James Baker, the US Secretary of State under Bush, stated that “shifting a policy away from cooperation

towards confrontation is a difficult proposition when support for a “policy of engagement” with Saddam Hussein’s government is fiercely embedded.”

Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq War was a highly profitable enterprise for the West, the Soviet Union, regional powers, and businesses alike. Funnelling armaments, including chemical weapons, into Saddam’s military arsenal to contain the Islamic regime, meant ignoring the appalling genocidal violence being conducted against civilians in Iraq. In the 1980s, US policymakers and journalists treated Saddam’s genocide against the Kurds and Yezidis as a product of war rather than as a genocidal campaign, despite the methodical nature in which villages were collectivized, systematic slaughter was conducted within designated “prohibited zones,” and chemical weapons were used against the Kurds and other minorities, including the Yezidis and Turkmen. In some respects, these actions exceeded the recent violence of ISIS.

This legacy of overlooking the brutalization of Yezidi communities by Saddam escalated after the deposition of the police state by George W. Bush’s administration. Washington and London’s miscalculations during the occupation of Iraq, rather than safeguarding the basic human rights of minorities, exacerbated their plight and exodus from Iraq.

During the occupation, significant intercommunal violence spilled over into open civil war (2006-2007) across Iraq. Several hundred miles to the southeast of the Yezidi communities, the capital of Iraq, Baghdad, was ripped apart by Shi’a and Sunni death squads conducting pogroms against their respective religious sects as American soldiers, supported by Iraqi Security Forces, continued their counterinsurgency operations against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq and affiliated jihadist cells. The Yezidis were eventually drawn into this violence as the impact of Baghdad’s civil war rippled across the shredded Iraqi state.

On April 22, 2007 a bus making its way from Mosul’s Textile Factory to the town of Bashika to drop off factory workers to their homes was ordered to pull over by armed men. They boarded the bus and checked cards for identification. Upon completion, all passengers, with the exception of twenty-three of Yezidi men, were driven deep into the city as the convoy accompanying them pulled over in northern Mosul. Within minutes, they were ordered off the bus, lined up against the wall, and shot. The convoy of gunmen departed, leaving the bodies of the men in the street riddled with bullets and the wall spattered with their blood.

According to the international media, the murders were acts of retribution against the Yezidis after an incident in the town of Bashika twenty-five kilometres north of Mosul weeks earlier. Situated in tranquil hills and surrounded by lush olive groves, the town was a popular destination for Mosul residents to retreat from the bustle of the city for family picnics and to escape from the tumult of the city. Under the American occupation, Bashika had remained relatively stable despite the vicious civil war gripping the rest of the country; there, Yezidi temples, Muslim mosques and Christian churches stood in close proximity, presenting a rare image of tolerant coexistence. The town’s quiet nature in many ways epitomized the subtle richness and cultural diversity that came to define Ninewa’s province over centuries of history.

However, the grisly stoning of Du’a  stoked a blood-feud, one fed by the propaganda of the most brutal factions of the Iraq War. As Du’a’s stoning went viral, Islamist extremists smeared the reputation of Bashika, a predominantly Yezidi town, and caught the attention of the international media. By this stage, tit-for-tat killings, executions and kidnappings had become a norm in post-Saddam Iraq. This violence between the Yezidis and Sunnis underscores the sharpening divide between minority groups and Islamist Sunnis and Shiites. These developments were ignored as Petraeus’ decision to secure the streets of Baghdad and to reopen space for political coordination between Iraq’s three main sects (the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Kurds) took priority. This move obscured the urgent threats facing minorities across the country.

With intermittent violence occurring daily alongside a counterinsurgency campaign, the stage was set for a devastating attack. While ISIS operatives were retreating, Sunni insurgents moved to occupy territories in the borderlands between Ninewa in Iraq and the Syrian provinces of Deir ez-Zor and al-Hasakah northwest of Iraq. These locations, ‘strips of the most impoverished and sparsely populated parts of Iraq and Syria,’ were the easiest places to escape US and ISF soldiers.

The territories of thousands of secular and religiously tolerant groups in the province were unprotected. For extremist cells, these groups presented an opportunity to foment sectarian violence and execute attacks against Ninewa’s soft underbelly. As Iraq’s most diverse province, dotted by perceived “devil worshippers,” “heretics,” and “infidels,” the minorities were soft targets for Al-Qa’ida cells. The increasing tensions between Yezidis and hardline Sunni Islamists had created an atmosphere that the terrorist organisation could exploit despite setbacks against the American occupation and Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. The Americans’ withdrawal from the region left minority groups vulnerable to attack, and jihadists were determined to take advantage of the security void left by the Americans.

On August 14, 2007 several trucks, each laced with 27,000 kilograms of explosives, destroyed the Yezidi villages of Kahtaniya and Jazeera. The coordinated suicide attacks killed over 800 men, women, and children, and wounded thousands more. The bombings by Al-Qa’ida in Iraq against the Yezidi communities in Kahtaniya and Jazeera were the second deadliest acts of terrorism in modern history behind the September 11 attacks in the United States.

Still, the acts of terror in Kahtaniya and Jazeera never gained the traction needed to highlight the plight of the Yezidis. The mass slaughter, while initially shocking, did not gain media coverage across the Western world. The massacre blended with news of other attacks as just another bombing in Iraq. Improvised Explosive Devices and Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices had swiftly become a deadly normality for Coalition soldiers and Iraqi civilians. To American policymakers, Kahtaniya and Jazeera was a blip in their “successful” surge. General Petraeus was determined to sell a disastrous war as an unqualified success, stating twenty-four days after the mass slaughter: “To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqis elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens.”

In the shattered villages of Kahtaniya and Jazeera, Yezidi communities spoke not of peace, but of impending extermination by extremist cells such Al-Qa’ida in Iraq. “Their aim is to annihilate us, to create trouble and kill all Yezidis because we are not Muslims” explained one villager from Kahtaniya. Another villager stated bluntly: “Another bombing like this and there will be no more Yezidis left.” Their warnings and pleas—wedded to the dissemination of leaflets and the spread of hate speech branding Yezidis as infidels, heretics, and outlaws—were ignored, resulting in dire consequences for the religious community and other minorities in Ninewa. Following the end of the American occupation and withdrawal of soldiers, the Mas‘ud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Peshmerga militia were unable to stop attacks launched against Yezidis living outside of the established security zone by Sunni militants.

Seven years later, Al-Qa’ida in Iraq reemerged in northern Iraq, cutting a swathe through Syria and Iraq as ISIS, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and former leaders of Saddam’s military. The Peshmerga, facing military defeat, fell back, with dire consequences for the Yezidis. ISIS’s project, founded upon the ultra-violent doctrine of Abu Bakr Naji “The Management of Savagery,” sought to “purify” Iraq and cleanse it of “apostates” and “heretics.” Shiites, Yezidis, Christians, and those who refused to pay jizya, a tax historically levied on non-Muslim subjects, faced a brutal ultimatum: leave or die.

ISIS evolved into a vicious regional faction. The factions were strengthened by strong cross-border ties with Sunni tribes in Syria and Iraq, the instability created by the Syrian War, the targeting of Sunni politicians, and the political alienation of the Sunni population by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In this context, Baghdadi and his puritanical fighters decided they would cleanse Ninewa of its ethnic and religious minorities by conducting systematic rape, torture, abduction and harrowing violence against the Yezidis and other minorities.

In August 2014, in the shadow of Mount Sinjar, ISIS militants rounded up and massacred Yezidi men and boys in Sinjar and the surrounding villages of Kocho, Qiniyeh, Jadali, and Jazeera. Yezidis who refused to pledge loyalty to Baghdadi and convert to Islam were executed at roadsides and prison centres. Along the roadsides, those fleeing for Mt. Sinjar were intercepted by ISIS vehicles. Yezidi women and children were abducted in the hundreds as personal prizes for jihadist fighters and subjected to sexual abuse, forced marriages to fighters, or sexual slavery. Others were sold to traffickers whose trade had flourished since the collapse of the Iraqi state in 2003, resulting in increasingly porous borders. In the wake of the cleaning operations, 830,000 people were displaced, the entire Yezidi population in Iraq uprooted, and 40,000-50,000 fled to Mt. Sinjar, historically a place of refuge for the community during conflict.

In a nutshell, the horrific violence between the Yezidi and Sunni communities encapsulates the brutalization of Iraqi society, culture, and politics by decades of ceaseless conflict, external intervention, and brutal authoritarian rule. In equal measure, it perfectly summarizes the grave amnesia of the great powers playing geopolitics in the Middle East, whose illusions of control have stood in contrast to decades of conflict and its impact on the region and its minority communities. The decline of the Yezidi population to less than one million is a microcosm of this appalling tragedy.

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Matthew C. K. Williams is a British freelance journalist with a MA degree in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Matthew has written for various NGOs and papers including Amnesty International, Strife, Aegis Trust, The Scottish Times and Osservatorio Mashrek. His current work for The Conflict Archives is focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq War, and insurgency across the Greater Middle East.”

This week’s update focuses on Yemen, Syria, and Burma. Though violence and atrocious living conditions continue in Yemen, a positive development comes as the Arab Coalition in Yemen has confirmed they will cease their use of British cluster bombs. Another ceasefire agreement was reached in Syria, this time excluding ISIS and their affiliates.

Middle East and North Africa

Syria

After the latest examples of despair in Syria, the Syrian government and rebel groups in the country have finally agreed to a ceasefire. On December 29, Vladimir Putin and the Turkish government confirmed the settlement. Russian state media stated, “the two sides had also agreed to enter peace talks to end the conflict that has raged for nearly six years.” Russia and Turkey will act as guarantors of the deal.

It is crucial to note the absence of jihadist groups in this deal. The Syrian army has stated that IS groups and their affiliates are not protected by the ceasefire. However, the deal includes the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham group, formerly known as al-Nusra Front, and until mid-2016 al-Qaeda’s Syria branch.

While this is the third nationwide ceasefire in Syria this year, STAND hopes it will last. The Syrian conflict has taken hundreds of thousands of lives and casualties will only grow if this resolve is not kept.

Southeast Asia

Burma

Systemic discrimination against the Rohingya people continues, with Bangladesh reporting that more than fifty thousand Rohingya have fled there since November. On January 3, a video was released of four armed police officers beating unarmed Rohingya men. The grotesque video went viral, causing outraged activists to call for action. In response, the office of Burma’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, announced that the four officers would be punished.

One of the countries criticizing Burma’s actions is Malaysia, where Prime Minister Najib Razak has criticized ill treatment of the Rohingya. He also led a rally in December protesting the ongoing discrimination. Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, a senior counter-terrorism official in Malaysia, warned that continuing to persecute the Rohingya could make Burma a target for ISIS. His statement was released after the Malaysian government detained a man planning to fight the Myanmar government on behalf of the Rohingya. The unidentified man is suspected to have ties to ISIS.

The Myanmar government continues to depict incidents of violence against the Rohingya as isolated instances, rather than acknowledging their large scale nature. On January 4, the Myanmar government published a report claiming that there was no evidence of genocide or mass rape carried out against the Rohingya.

Emerging Conflicts

Yemen

The humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen continues to rage as the bitter conflict in a seemingly more unstable Middle East appears to have no end in sight. Over 3 million Yemenis have been displaced from their homes, and medical infrastructure, some hundreds of facilities, have been destroyed in constant fighting and bombardment, both from rebels and the Saudi-led coalition and its allies. Groups like Doctors Without Borders have faced growing pressures as a result of the conflict, and many aid organizations have simply pulled out of the region due to the massive security risk, and oftentimes the total disregard for the special protections given to humanitarian workers and civilian facilities under international law. This means that millions lack access to health facilities for basic needs, let alone war-related injuries, and understaffed and undersupplied hospitals are forced to take on more and more patients. The most vulnerable populations appear to be the elderly, pregnant women, and children. Malnourishment, notably in rural areas, has become another major issue, as over half a million children in Yemen face this condition, according to UNICEF. This has contributed significantly to civilian suffering as deaths from the conflict are expected to climb to well over 10,000 by the end of the year, with countless more injuries reported. Many of these casualties are a result of indiscriminate attacks from both rebel forces, through artillery and mortars, and the Saudi-led coalition, mainly through airstrikes.

However, in a positive development, the Arab Coalition in Yemen has confirmed they will no longer use British cluster bombs, which have an especially devastating impact on civilian casualties and infrastructure. Nonetheless, the international community appears to be at a loss regarding a possible long-term solution for Yemen, as previous ceasefires and proposals for talks or a unity government have fallen apart.

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Ana Delgado is STAND’s Middle East and North Africa Coordinator, focusing mainly on Syria. She is a junior at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, majoring in Political Science and Peace, War, and Defense.

Amala Karri is STAND’s Policy Intern and attends Hunter College High School in New York. She contributed STAND’s Burma Update for this week’s Education News Brief.

Jason Qu is STAND’s Emerging Conflicts Coordinator, focusing today on Yemen and Pakistan. He is a Senior at Bronx High School of Science.

1) Syria

2016 was a disastrous year for an already horrific conflict, as the Assad regime stepped up its use of sieges and as the fight for Aleppo last month became even harsher than many expected. The rebels are increasingly weak, particularly more moderate factions, and many rebels and civilians who were in formerly rebel-held territory, particularly around Aleppo, have been pushed into Idlib. The possibility remains that civilians that survived the brutal siege of Aleppo will once again face similar circumstances as the Syrian government and its allies push to retake further opposition territory. The U.S.,an increasingly peripheral player in the conflict, was left out of the most recent round of peace talks, and President-Elect Trump seems likely to withdraw support with the opposition and increase cooperation with Russia, a main ally of Assad. Turkey has also become more cooperative with Russia and is now focusing on combatting Kurdish influence rather than supporting the opposition. Already struggling after recent territorial losses, the Islamic State will also likely lose influence in 2017.

2) South Sudan

Having already caused immense suffering since its start in 2013, South Sudan’s civil war threatens to spiral even further in 2017. Originally caused by a split between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar, the SPLM-IO—Machar’s side—has split. Kiir appointed Taban Deng Gai to replace Machar as Vice President, and his decision to force Machar out of the country has left his supporters feeling unrepresented. The repeated failure of political negotiations has led many actors to see violence as their only route to power. Ethnic divisions have also solidified, and the region of Equatoria in particular has seen increased violence. This combination of factors has led to increasingly dire warnings, with the UN announcing that ethnic cleansing is already underway. The international response has been underwhelming, with the UN unable to come to an agreement on a potential arms embargo.

3) Burma (Myanmar)

The Muslim ethnic minority group, the Rohingya, has long lived in dire conditions, stripped of citizenship and often forced to live in internally displaced people (IDP) camps. Described as the world’s group most at risk of genocide, there is an ever-lingering risk of a spark setting off mass violence. Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto leader of the country, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have shown little interest in the Rohingya and seemingly lack the ability to control the military, who is in charge of managing the situation in Rakhine State. Security forces and members of the Rakhine ethnic group have both perpetrated violence against Rohingya, and the October killing of several police officers—with a group of Rohingya accused to be the attackers—has raised tensions. There are also reports that some Rohingya have reacted to their continued subjection through the creation of an insurgency. However, Rohingya know from experience that any violence they may perpetrate would likely lead to retaliation against Rohingya civilians. Reports of a plan among security forces to arm non-Muslim civilians also raise fears of increased violence. Should the situation deteriorate, almost no Burmese actors seem ready to come to the Rohingya’s defense. As the crisis continues, the government must reconsider its approach to the issue, build positive relations between the majority Buddhist and minority Muslim populations, and cease the use of excessive force against civilians, lest they precipitate the growth of a small number of Rohingya insurgents.

Additionally, ethnic groups around the country—such as the eastern Shan, Karen, Kokang, and Kachin, Ta’ang, and Arakan, now in an alliance—are politically sidelined and face violence at the hands of Myanmar government militias, even after Aung San Suu Kyi’s 21-Century Panglong Conference. There is speculation that the NLD is keeping quiet on the military’s blockade of transport and aid in these areas due to pre-election agreements with the military. Tensions and periodic violence seem unlikely to cease in 2017.

4) Sudan

Sudan is primed for significant violence against civilians in 2017, but much of it may remain out of the public spotlight. The Sudanese government has cut off access for journalists and aid workers to areas where it has conducted attacks on civilians, including much of Darfur, and many believe violence in Darfur may be returning towards levels from the height of the conflict. Huge numbers of internally displaced people remain in Sudan with almost no access to aid and few means to support themselves. In addition to Darfur, the Sudanese government continues to bomb civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In an extremely alarming development in the conflict, Amnesty International also found evidence of 30 likely chemical attacks against civilians from January to September 2016. There is unlikely to be any large reduction of violence in 2017, as peace talks have broken down and the government remains invested in crushing rebellion. Sudan is also facing reduced international pressure. Many European governments have proved willing to support Sudan in order to prevent refugees from reaching their shores, while the U.S. is rumored to be preparing to lift sanctions.

5) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Despite recent progress, uncertainty over President Kabila’s willingness to step down as president suggests conflict could escalate in the country in 2017. Kabila is constitutionally mandated to step down after two terms, and his second term was mandated to end in December 2016. After his pasts effort to amend the constitution to allow a third term failed, Kabila implemented various measures to push back his exit date, frequently citing concerns about the country’s readiness to conduct elections. A recent deal brokered by the Catholic Church calls for President Kabila to step down and elections to be held by the end of 2017, but it is unclear whether Kabila will respect the deal. If he does not, violence will likely escalate as hundreds have already been killed in confrontations between police and protesters. Armed groups outside urban areas have also used ongoing political uncertainty to gain influence and territory. Meanwhile, the largest cause of civilian death in the DRC remains insurgencies in the country’s east, though these groups are far less powerful and are more splintered than they were at their peak.

6) Yemen

Though unlikely to escalate significantly, Yemen’s devastating conflict seems likely to grind on. The conflict has moved towards equilibrium with no side strong enough to win, but both also unwilling to give up. On one side of the conflict is the former Yemeni government of Abd Mansur Hadi, heavily backed by a Saudi-led coalition. The Saudis are certain to continue their bombings, as they believe the defeat of the Hadi government would advantage their rival, Iran. The US continues to back the coalition, albeit more tentatively, as a recent decision to block an arms sale signifies. For their part, Hadi’s government has little power but maintains some influence in the south. On the other side, the Houthi rebels maintain control of much of the country, including the capital Sana’a, but are struggling to govern. They remain in an uneasy alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and receive limited support from Iran. Saudi bombings have frequently hit civilians and the conflict has devastated the economy. Hunger is extremely widespread and the Saudi coalition has repeatedly blocked the delivery of aid, continuously bombing major ports and further threatening aid delivery.

7) Burundi

President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to seek what is considered by many to be an unconstitutional third term sparked recent conflict in Burundi. Although he is now securely placed in his third term, the situation is far from resolution. Extrajudicial executions continue and thousands have died throughout the course of the conflict. The conflict has remained primarily political rather than ethnic, but there are signs that violence against Tutsi could increase. The Burundian government’s decision to leave the International Criminal Court suggests that their human rights record will not soon improve, and the recent assassination of a government official also raises tensions. Peace talks have stalled since July, when the government pulled out of the talks. Opposition groups were upset last month when chief mediator, former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, urged them to look toward the 2020 elections, seeming to ignore their concerns about the 2015 election. In this context, talks seem unlikely to resume, as the opposition feels slighted, and Nkurunziza feels that he can retain power with no real resistance. An armed insurgency in exile remains capable of conducting attacks, though it holds relatively little power and is unlikely to seriously threaten Nkurunziza’s government. Still, as long as they are denied political rights there is the possibility that more opposition supporters will choose to use violence.

8) Ethiopia

Ethiopia has suffered significant unrest over the last year after protests emerged in the Oromia region. Originally concentrated on feelings of underrepresentation and marginalization of the Oromo ethnic group, the protests have spread to the Amhara region and have given voice to discontent with the government. Long seen as a champion of an authoritarian development model, Ethiopia has cracked down heavily on the protests and shown few signs of a democratic opening. Amnesty International has found that security forces have killed over 800 people since protests began in November 2015. With the opposition also growing increasingly disillusioned with the potential for peaceful change, potential for violence in 2017 is high.

9) Kenya

August’s elections could very well proceed successfully and represent democratic progress in Kenya, but they also hold significant potential for conflict. President Uhuru Kenyatta will be contested by Raila Odinga in a repeat of the 2013 election. In the 2007 election, Odinga’s defeat led to violence killing around 1,000 people, while the 2013 election remained quite peaceful. It is unclear which path 2017 will take, but there are warning signs that suggest potential violence. Trust in IEBC, the electoral commission, is low, and blows to Kenyatta’s popularity may cause a highly competitive election. Further, despite demand, the Kenyatta government has struggled to provide reforms, and continued police brutality has incited protests and raised fears of a heavy-handed response in the case of post-election protests. In addition to national elections, 47 counties will also hold local elections, and as ethnic tensions in several parts of the country remain high, it will not take much for localized conflict to erupt.

10) Zimbabwe

92-year old President Robert Mugabe’s insistence on staying in power after 36 years in charge threatens to spark conflict in Zimbabwe. 2016 already saw increased resistance to Mugabe, with protests gaining ground in the summer. Youth activists, often using social media to spread messages such as that of previously unknown Pastor Evan Mawawire—the founder of the #ThisFlag movement to end corruption and increase government transparency and accountability—were at the heart of the protests. Police cracked down heavily on protesters, but calls continued to urge Mugabe to step down immediately, rather than wait for elections in 2018 when Mugabe intends to run for re-election. Ongoing economic problems have also damaged the popularity of Mugabe’s government. Still, the potential for Mugabe to be forced from power hinges on a number of uncertainties, including the strengthening of a divided opposition and the military’s loyalty to Mugabe. Two things remain quite a bit more certain: that Mugabe will not cede power easily and many Zimbabweans will wish he would.

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Timmy Hirschel-Burns is a senior at Swarthmore College majoring in Political Science and is STAND’s Policy Coordinator. You can follow him on Twitter at @TimH_B.

Featured photo is by The White Helmets.