Somalia

As the international community continues to grapple with October’s brutal terror attack in Mogadishu, the United States has steadily increased its provision of military aid to the region, increasing personnel more than twofold. The revamping of America’s military presence in the Horn of Africa has manifested in two new military headquarters in Mogadishu, as well as an escalation of airstrikes. This was perhaps prompted by AMISOM’s seemingly abrupt decision to begin withdrawing troops from Somalia last month. As AMISOM transitions out of the region, it is sure to leave a security vacuum, which the United States appears amenable to fill. Indeed, the United States’ military initiative in the region comes at a time when mounting conflict has prevented the government from establishing proper aid infrastructure to reach the millions of people currently at risk of food insecurity. As the United States escalates its military presence in Somalia, it remains to be seen whether the increasingly protected Somali government will commit itself to a more effective approach to transport and agricultural infrastructure.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia has continued to be ravaged by mounting ethnic conflict in Oromia, a region of the country where over 200,000 people have been displaced by violence. Conflict between the Oromo and Somali regions of Ethiopia has led to sporadic violence perpetrated by the regional governments of both provinces, with the Oromo criticizing the federal government for not doing more to quell the fighting. The Oromo contend that the federal government has refused to provide sufficient aid to the region, following a year and a half of anti-government protests held there. As a result of a poorly coordinated federal initiative to quell the violence, thousands of Oromo have been forced into refugee camps and hundreds more have lost their lives.

Sudan and South Sudan

Sudan

In continuation of August arms control policies, which has a stated aim to decrease weapons smuggling in Darfur, Sudanese Vice President Abdel Rahman made moves to aid the disarmament process by registering unregulated vehicles. This process has intensified as a widespread belief has emerged that it could ignite a series of armed conflicts between tribal leaders, local militias, and the government, putting civilians at risk. The Vice President is also cracking down on smuggling in Sudan’s porous border.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s favorable treatment of Sudan is becoming a trend. After sanctions were lifted in October, supposedly to improve economic development and to decrease their trade with North Korea, the U.S. is now open to removing Sudan as a state sponsor of terror. If the government in Khartoum continues to distance themselves from North Korea, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan says Sudan will be removed from the list. Sudan’s ties to North Korea aren’t the only relations that Sudan has to groups unfriendly to the U.S. Reminiscent of Sudan’s ties to Al Qaeda, Sudan apparently has ties to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas. Nevertheless, Sudan’s human rights record continues to be appalling, especially when it comes to freedom of speech and religion. Church demolitions are common and the country is dangerous for journalists as the National Intelligence and Security Services censor any news unfavorable to the government.

South Sudan

On November 15, UN ambassador Nikki Haley, shocked by her October visit, spoke at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, criticizing South Sudanese government forces for exacerbating and perpetuating ethnically-based conflict, while also saying the fault was on both sides. She brought to light issues of women’s rights by exposing terrible living conditions and rampant rape committed by government forces. In contrast to the unconditional support Kiir has received from other U.S. leaders, Haley has taken a hard stance concerning Kiir’s human rights record with hopes that he will go beyond denial and conciliatory rhetoric. Kiir has allowed humanitarian groups complete access to the country in hopes it will alleviate the current famine. In a country where policy implementation is so decentralized and perverted by ethnic conflict, cohesion on the part of the state is necessary to signify a true change in policy.

On Monday, the two factions within the South Sudan’s People Liberation Army (the SPLM and the SPLM-In Opposition) were united, which may help end conflict in South Sudan. These factions represent the rift between President Salva Kiir and exiled former Vice President Riek Machar, as well as the wider ethno-political conflict. Despite this move, Lt. Gen. Wesley Welebe Samson says that “The Cairo Declaration that was signed by fragmented factions of South Sudan’s SPLM party will not bring peace without the release, return and full participation of SPLA/M-IO Chairman and Commander in Chief Dr. Riek Machar Teny.” Riek Machar, the former Vice President of South Sudan, denounced the entire negotiation process. This is not unexpected as he rejected negotiations in Kampala this June, which hinged on his release and the unification of the two factions.

Middle East and North Africa

Yemen

The UN has urged Saudi Arabia to allow humanitarian aid into Yemen. Early in November, as a response to a missile attack fired by Houthi rebels on Riyadh, Saudi Arabia imposed a blockade on all ports in Yemen after the bombing of the Sana’a airport. Justifying their decision by claiming humanitarian aid shipments are used to smuggle arms, the Saudi government has put millions of civilians at risk.  

Immediately after the blockade’s implementation, there was a global outcry. Human rights organizations expressed alarm about the threatening situation. Some of the aid that was impeded includes at least three UN airplanes full of emergency supplies; support from the World Food Program, which has been feeding seven million people a month in Yemen; and medicine for a widespread cholera outbreak.

While the block on southern ports was lifted, the situation in Yemen continues to be indisputably grave. The Guardian reports that while this was a step in the right direction, noting that the embargo remains “on all Houthi-controlled ports in northern Yemen, including Hodeidah, through which 70% of aid has been transported.”

Disease and famine resulting from destitute conditions have only been exacerbated by the blockade. A drastic increase in fuel prices and cooking gas has resulted in less pumping stations. Less pumping stations, in turn, have caused the elimination of clean water from five major cities. With seven million people on the brink of man-made famine, the gross violation of rights is evident.

Egypt

Egypt recently issued a warning to Ethiopia for its ongoing construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egyptians fear will cut into their water supply. Negotiations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and neighboring Sudan have broken down, and President El-Sisi of Egypt has threatened that “no one can touch Egypt’s share of water.”

On November 24, militants bombed a Sufi Mosque located in the Sinai Peninsula, killing 305 people and wounding 128. Most of the victims were Sufi Muslims. Soon after, the Egyptian government administered airstrikes targeting the militants who were responsible for the attack.

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Soham Mehta is STAND’s Sudan and South Sudan Coordinator. He is currently a sophomore in high school at BASIS Chandler. Soham hopes to help educate people about of the scale and prevalence of genocides in order to raise awareness for legislation to counter current atrocities and to dissuade future ones. In his free time, Soham enjoys volunteering, drawing, and playing the guitar.

Sael Soni is STAND’s Horn of Africa Coordinator. Sael is a freshman at Vanderbilt University. His interests lay mostly in understanding the dynamics of post-Colonial Latin America and the intersection of human rights and economic policy.

Ana Delgado is STAND’s Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Coordinator. Ana Delgado is a senior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is studying Political Science and Peace, War, & Defense while minoring in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. After graduation, Ana hopes to pursue a law degree with an emphasis on human rights.

In January, after 140 people had been killed, the government decided to withdraw the plan. In a statement, government officials claimed to have “huge respect” for the Oromo and explained that the opposition to the plan was based on a misunderstanding. For many protesters, this response was too little, too late. According to an Amnesty International report, even after the master plan was scrapped, the Ethiopian government continued to imprison Oromo leaders and marginalize members of the Oromo ethnic group. Protesters refused to go back home, and their demands broadened to include fair political representation and basic human rights protections. Though Ethiopia claims to be a democracy, countless hurdles impede the formation of rival political parties and their attempts to obtain power. For the Oromo, their oppression at the hands of the Tigrayans, who make up only 6% of the country’s population, is unacceptable. It is also nothing new. The Oromo have been marginalized since before 1973, which is when they formed the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). When the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) came to power in 1991, the OLF joined the transitional government. Unfortunately, it was not long before the EPRDF created another Oromo party, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, in order to weaken the OLF. Now, the Oromo are back on the streets, fighting for their rights.

In July, the protests worsened, expanding into Ethiopia’s Amhara region. After the Oromo, the Amhara are the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, and over the past few months, tens of thousands have come together to demonstrate against government oppression and ethnic violence.

The government’s response has been brutal. Since the protests began, approximately 800 people have been killed. The police have responded to peaceful protests with violence, exacerbating the existing tensions: Al Jazeera reports that in one instance, the police fired tear gas and warning shots at a group of protesters attending a religious festival. When the protesters turned to run away, several people were crushed to death, leading to a total death toll of approximately 100 according to human rights groups, and 55 according to the government. Furthermore, the government has conducted mass arrests as part of a larger campaign to silence civilians. According to Al Jazeera, more than 11,000 people have been arrested since the demonstrations began last year. Of these, more than 300 are women. The government has also restrained free speech by shutting down all mobile Internet to prevent communications and isolate those dissidents outside of prison. On December 2, the government partially restored Internet, but social media and messaging platforms are still blocked throughout the country.

Unfortunately, the government refuses to acknowledge the valid concerns of Oromo and Amhara dissidents and the legitimacy of their protests. Rather, they have denounced dissidents for disturbing the peace. In a recent statement, a government spokesman vowed to hold those that “started” the chaos responsible. In another statement, a spokesman declared Egypt and Eritrea responsible for the violence, alluding to the possibility that the government would ban protests to try to end the unrest.

These protests have the ability to lead to political change. For the first time, the Oromo and Amhara oppositions have coalesced into a single force against the government, and now pose a greater threat to Ethiopia’s political leadership. The authoritarian regime’s increasing fear of subversion could make it more responsive to its citizens’ needs. The Oromo need a stable government just as much as the government needs the Oromia region—the source of much of Ethiopia’s food and most of its coffee (a large export).

Political change in Ethiopia is critical. The Oromo are a historically oppressed group that have not been offered the same economic and political opportunities as the Tigrayans. It is unlikely that the protests will end until the government acknowledges their legitimacy and agrees to implement reforms. For now, it is unlikely that the opposition will trust the current ruling coalition, the EPRDF, to make necessary changes. For years, it has simultaneously promised to implement reforms and violated human rights. Until they are truly held accountable to their people or a new coalition comes to power, hundreds more Ethiopian dissidents will likely be mercilessly killed and tortured, and thousands imprisoned.

In addition the the need for internal reforms, other countries must fundamentally change the way that they deal with Ethiopia. Human Rights Watch has called for influential countries, such as the US (Ethiopia’s largest donor) and the UK, to publicly condemn the Ethiopian government’s actions. These allies should also push for an international investigation of Ethiopia’s deteriorating human rights situation, both increasing increasing the transparency of how the Ethiopian government deals with dissidents and political opponents and sending a powerful message that such actions will not be tolerated. Now is not the time for the US to stay silent.

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Amala Karri is STAND’s policy intern and attends Hunter College High School in New York.

Featured photo above provided by Reuters.

1) Syria

2016 was a disastrous year for an already horrific conflict, as the Assad regime stepped up its use of sieges and as the fight for Aleppo last month became even harsher than many expected. The rebels are increasingly weak, particularly more moderate factions, and many rebels and civilians who were in formerly rebel-held territory, particularly around Aleppo, have been pushed into Idlib. The possibility remains that civilians that survived the brutal siege of Aleppo will once again face similar circumstances as the Syrian government and its allies push to retake further opposition territory. The U.S.,an increasingly peripheral player in the conflict, was left out of the most recent round of peace talks, and President-Elect Trump seems likely to withdraw support with the opposition and increase cooperation with Russia, a main ally of Assad. Turkey has also become more cooperative with Russia and is now focusing on combatting Kurdish influence rather than supporting the opposition. Already struggling after recent territorial losses, the Islamic State will also likely lose influence in 2017.

2) South Sudan

Having already caused immense suffering since its start in 2013, South Sudan’s civil war threatens to spiral even further in 2017. Originally caused by a split between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar, the SPLM-IO—Machar’s side—has split. Kiir appointed Taban Deng Gai to replace Machar as Vice President, and his decision to force Machar out of the country has left his supporters feeling unrepresented. The repeated failure of political negotiations has led many actors to see violence as their only route to power. Ethnic divisions have also solidified, and the region of Equatoria in particular has seen increased violence. This combination of factors has led to increasingly dire warnings, with the UN announcing that ethnic cleansing is already underway. The international response has been underwhelming, with the UN unable to come to an agreement on a potential arms embargo.

3) Burma (Myanmar)

The Muslim ethnic minority group, the Rohingya, has long lived in dire conditions, stripped of citizenship and often forced to live in internally displaced people (IDP) camps. Described as the world’s group most at risk of genocide, there is an ever-lingering risk of a spark setting off mass violence. Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto leader of the country, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have shown little interest in the Rohingya and seemingly lack the ability to control the military, who is in charge of managing the situation in Rakhine State. Security forces and members of the Rakhine ethnic group have both perpetrated violence against Rohingya, and the October killing of several police officers—with a group of Rohingya accused to be the attackers—has raised tensions. There are also reports that some Rohingya have reacted to their continued subjection through the creation of an insurgency. However, Rohingya know from experience that any violence they may perpetrate would likely lead to retaliation against Rohingya civilians. Reports of a plan among security forces to arm non-Muslim civilians also raise fears of increased violence. Should the situation deteriorate, almost no Burmese actors seem ready to come to the Rohingya’s defense. As the crisis continues, the government must reconsider its approach to the issue, build positive relations between the majority Buddhist and minority Muslim populations, and cease the use of excessive force against civilians, lest they precipitate the growth of a small number of Rohingya insurgents.

Additionally, ethnic groups around the country—such as the eastern Shan, Karen, Kokang, and Kachin, Ta’ang, and Arakan, now in an alliance—are politically sidelined and face violence at the hands of Myanmar government militias, even after Aung San Suu Kyi’s 21-Century Panglong Conference. There is speculation that the NLD is keeping quiet on the military’s blockade of transport and aid in these areas due to pre-election agreements with the military. Tensions and periodic violence seem unlikely to cease in 2017.

4) Sudan

Sudan is primed for significant violence against civilians in 2017, but much of it may remain out of the public spotlight. The Sudanese government has cut off access for journalists and aid workers to areas where it has conducted attacks on civilians, including much of Darfur, and many believe violence in Darfur may be returning towards levels from the height of the conflict. Huge numbers of internally displaced people remain in Sudan with almost no access to aid and few means to support themselves. In addition to Darfur, the Sudanese government continues to bomb civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In an extremely alarming development in the conflict, Amnesty International also found evidence of 30 likely chemical attacks against civilians from January to September 2016. There is unlikely to be any large reduction of violence in 2017, as peace talks have broken down and the government remains invested in crushing rebellion. Sudan is also facing reduced international pressure. Many European governments have proved willing to support Sudan in order to prevent refugees from reaching their shores, while the U.S. is rumored to be preparing to lift sanctions.

5) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Despite recent progress, uncertainty over President Kabila’s willingness to step down as president suggests conflict could escalate in the country in 2017. Kabila is constitutionally mandated to step down after two terms, and his second term was mandated to end in December 2016. After his pasts effort to amend the constitution to allow a third term failed, Kabila implemented various measures to push back his exit date, frequently citing concerns about the country’s readiness to conduct elections. A recent deal brokered by the Catholic Church calls for President Kabila to step down and elections to be held by the end of 2017, but it is unclear whether Kabila will respect the deal. If he does not, violence will likely escalate as hundreds have already been killed in confrontations between police and protesters. Armed groups outside urban areas have also used ongoing political uncertainty to gain influence and territory. Meanwhile, the largest cause of civilian death in the DRC remains insurgencies in the country’s east, though these groups are far less powerful and are more splintered than they were at their peak.

6) Yemen

Though unlikely to escalate significantly, Yemen’s devastating conflict seems likely to grind on. The conflict has moved towards equilibrium with no side strong enough to win, but both also unwilling to give up. On one side of the conflict is the former Yemeni government of Abd Mansur Hadi, heavily backed by a Saudi-led coalition. The Saudis are certain to continue their bombings, as they believe the defeat of the Hadi government would advantage their rival, Iran. The US continues to back the coalition, albeit more tentatively, as a recent decision to block an arms sale signifies. For their part, Hadi’s government has little power but maintains some influence in the south. On the other side, the Houthi rebels maintain control of much of the country, including the capital Sana’a, but are struggling to govern. They remain in an uneasy alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and receive limited support from Iran. Saudi bombings have frequently hit civilians and the conflict has devastated the economy. Hunger is extremely widespread and the Saudi coalition has repeatedly blocked the delivery of aid, continuously bombing major ports and further threatening aid delivery.

7) Burundi

President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to seek what is considered by many to be an unconstitutional third term sparked recent conflict in Burundi. Although he is now securely placed in his third term, the situation is far from resolution. Extrajudicial executions continue and thousands have died throughout the course of the conflict. The conflict has remained primarily political rather than ethnic, but there are signs that violence against Tutsi could increase. The Burundian government’s decision to leave the International Criminal Court suggests that their human rights record will not soon improve, and the recent assassination of a government official also raises tensions. Peace talks have stalled since July, when the government pulled out of the talks. Opposition groups were upset last month when chief mediator, former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, urged them to look toward the 2020 elections, seeming to ignore their concerns about the 2015 election. In this context, talks seem unlikely to resume, as the opposition feels slighted, and Nkurunziza feels that he can retain power with no real resistance. An armed insurgency in exile remains capable of conducting attacks, though it holds relatively little power and is unlikely to seriously threaten Nkurunziza’s government. Still, as long as they are denied political rights there is the possibility that more opposition supporters will choose to use violence.

8) Ethiopia

Ethiopia has suffered significant unrest over the last year after protests emerged in the Oromia region. Originally concentrated on feelings of underrepresentation and marginalization of the Oromo ethnic group, the protests have spread to the Amhara region and have given voice to discontent with the government. Long seen as a champion of an authoritarian development model, Ethiopia has cracked down heavily on the protests and shown few signs of a democratic opening. Amnesty International has found that security forces have killed over 800 people since protests began in November 2015. With the opposition also growing increasingly disillusioned with the potential for peaceful change, potential for violence in 2017 is high.

9) Kenya

August’s elections could very well proceed successfully and represent democratic progress in Kenya, but they also hold significant potential for conflict. President Uhuru Kenyatta will be contested by Raila Odinga in a repeat of the 2013 election. In the 2007 election, Odinga’s defeat led to violence killing around 1,000 people, while the 2013 election remained quite peaceful. It is unclear which path 2017 will take, but there are warning signs that suggest potential violence. Trust in IEBC, the electoral commission, is low, and blows to Kenyatta’s popularity may cause a highly competitive election. Further, despite demand, the Kenyatta government has struggled to provide reforms, and continued police brutality has incited protests and raised fears of a heavy-handed response in the case of post-election protests. In addition to national elections, 47 counties will also hold local elections, and as ethnic tensions in several parts of the country remain high, it will not take much for localized conflict to erupt.

10) Zimbabwe

92-year old President Robert Mugabe’s insistence on staying in power after 36 years in charge threatens to spark conflict in Zimbabwe. 2016 already saw increased resistance to Mugabe, with protests gaining ground in the summer. Youth activists, often using social media to spread messages such as that of previously unknown Pastor Evan Mawawire—the founder of the #ThisFlag movement to end corruption and increase government transparency and accountability—were at the heart of the protests. Police cracked down heavily on protesters, but calls continued to urge Mugabe to step down immediately, rather than wait for elections in 2018 when Mugabe intends to run for re-election. Ongoing economic problems have also damaged the popularity of Mugabe’s government. Still, the potential for Mugabe to be forced from power hinges on a number of uncertainties, including the strengthening of a divided opposition and the military’s loyalty to Mugabe. Two things remain quite a bit more certain: that Mugabe will not cede power easily and many Zimbabweans will wish he would.

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Timmy Hirschel-Burns is a senior at Swarthmore College majoring in Political Science and is STAND’s Policy Coordinator. You can follow him on Twitter at @TimH_B.

Featured photo is by The White Helmets.