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		<title>Top 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2017</title>
		<link>https://standnow.org/2017/01/03/conflictstowatch2017/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2017 20:13:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Timmy Hirschel-Burns]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burundi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aleppo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amhara]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amharic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amnesty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amnesty International]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arakan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aung San Suu Kyi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chemical weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[darfur]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democratic republic of the congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drc]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethiopia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hadi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic State]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kabila]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kachin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kenya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kenyatta]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kinshasa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kokang]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mkapa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mugabe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Myanmar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national league for democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nkurunziza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NLD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Odinga]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oromia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oromo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Panglong]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rakhine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RDC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[riek machar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rohingya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[salva kiir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[south sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SPLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SPLM-IO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ta'ang]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tatmadaw]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ThisFlag]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tutsi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[yemen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zimbabwe]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Predicting future atrocities is exceptionally difficult, as one must anticipate reactions from a variety of actors within complex systems. For those of us that use these forecasts to attempt to...<a class="moretag" href="https://standnow.org/2017/01/03/conflictstowatch2017/"> Read more…</a>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Predicting future atrocities is exceptionally difficult, as one must anticipate reactions from a variety of actors within complex systems. For those of us that use these forecasts to attempt to prevent atrocities, a successful response is one that prevents an atrocity that would have otherwise happened, thus making the forecasts look mistaken. Nevertheless, anticipating the future course of conflicts is a vital component of atrocity prevention, and forecasting efforts are growing increasingly sophisticated. The </span><a href="https://www.earlywarningproject.org/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Early Warning Project</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and</span><a href="http://www.cfr.org/conflict-assessment/preventive-priorities-survey-2017/p38562"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the Council on Foreign Relations Preventive Priorities Survey</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> are among the leading forecasts, and while we aren’t contributing a full forecast, it’s worth looking ahead to conflicts that could deteriorate or emerge in 2017 in order to assist prevention efforts. Civilians have often bore the brunt of conflicts, and sadly 2017 is unlikely to be different. </span></p>
<h1>1) Syria</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">2016 was a disastrous year for an already horrific conflict, as the Assad regime stepped up its use of sieges and as the fight for Aleppo last month became even harsher than many expected. The rebels are increasingly weak, particularly more moderate factions, and many rebels and civilians who were in formerly rebel-held territory, particularly around Aleppo, have been pushed into Idlib. The possibility remains that civilians that survived the brutal siege of Aleppo will once again face similar circumstances as the Syrian government and its allies push to retake further opposition territory. The U.S.,an increasingly peripheral player in the conflict, was left out of the most recent round of peace talks, and President-Elect Trump seems likely to withdraw support with the opposition and increase cooperation with Russia, a main ally of Assad. </span><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38473702"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Turkey has also become more cooperative with Russia</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and is now focusing on combatting Kurdish influence rather than supporting the opposition. Already struggling after </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/07/losing-ground-fighter-morale-is-it-all-over-for-isis-syria-turkey"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent territorial losses</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the Islamic State will also likely lose influence in 2017.</span></p>
<h1>2) South Sudan</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Having already caused immense suffering since its start in 2013, South Sudan’s civil war threatens to spiral even further in 2017. Originally caused by a split between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar, the SPLM-IO—Machar’s side—has split. Kiir appointed Taban Deng Gai to replace Machar as Vice President, and his decision to force Machar out of the country has left his supporters feeling unrepresented. The repeated failure of political negotiations has led many actors to see violence as their only route to power. </span><a href="http://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2016/11/25/genocidal-logic-south-sudan%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cgun-class%E2%80%9D?utm_content=buffere7e19&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ethnic divisions</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> have also solidified, </span><a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20785/does-any-party-in-south-sudan-have-the-will-to-prevent-genocide"><span style="font-weight: 400;">and the region of Equatoria in particular has seen increased violence</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This combination of factors has led to increasingly dire warnings, </span><a href="http://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2016/11/25/genocidal-logic-south-sudan%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cgun-class%E2%80%9D?utm_content=buffere7e19&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">with the UN announcing that ethnic cleansing is already underway</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The international response has been underwhelming, with the </span><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/outrage-blocks-south-sudan-arms-embargo-161223153844996.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UN unable to come to an agreement on a potential arms embargo</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<h1>3) Burma (Myanmar)</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Muslim ethnic minority group, the Rohingya, has long lived in dire conditions, stripped of citizenship and often forced to live in internally displaced people (IDP) camps. Described as the world’s group most at risk of genocide, there is an ever-lingering risk of a spark setting off mass violence. Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto leader of the country, </span><a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20432/troubling-signs-of-unrest-in-western-myanmar-threaten-suu-kyi-s-fragile-government"><span style="font-weight: 400;">and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have shown little interest in the Rohingya</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and seemingly lack the ability to control the military, who is in charge of managing the situation in Rakhine State. Security forces and members of the Rakhine ethnic group have both perpetrated violence against Rohingya, and </span><a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/12/09/what-does-the-bloodshed-in-rakhine-state-tell-us/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AsiaUnbound%2FJKurlantzick+%28Asia+Unbound+%C2%BB+Joshua+Kurlantzick%29"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the October killing of several police officers</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">—with a group of Rohingya accused to be the attackers—has raised tensions. There are also </span><a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/12/16/is-rakhine-state-home-to-a-growing-insurgency/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AsiaUnbound%2FJKurlantzick+%28Asia+Unbound+%C2%BB+Joshua+Kurlantzick%29"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reports</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that some Rohingya have reacted to their continued subjection through </span><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the creation of an insurgency</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. However, Rohingya know from experience that any violence they may perpetrate would likely lead to retaliation against Rohingya civilians. Reports of a plan among security forces to arm non-Muslim civilians also raise fears of increased violence. Should the situation deteriorate, almost no Burmese actors seem ready to come to the Rohingya’s defense. As the crisis continues, the government must reconsider its approach to the issue, build positive relations between the majority Buddhist and minority Muslim populations, and cease the use of excessive force against civilians, lest they precipitate the growth of a small number of Rohingya insurgents.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Additionally, ethnic groups around the country—such as the eastern </span><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-latest-ethnic-conflict-intensifies-as-violence-spreads-in-shan-state-a6928291.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Shan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><a href="http://karennews.org/2017/01/international-based-groups-denied-vote-at-knu-16th-congress-elections-congress-election-outcome-critical-to-how-knu-progresses-its-peace-plans.html/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Karen</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><a href="http://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/the-battle-for-gideon-a-kachin-perspective.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kokang</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and </span><a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/kachin-independence-army-teams-11212016141619.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kachin, Ta’ang, and Arakan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, now in an alliance—are politically sidelined and face violence at the hands of Myanmar government militias, even after Aung San Suu Kyi’s 21-Century Panglong Conference. There is speculation that the NLD is keeping quiet on the </span><a href="http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/civil-society-organizations-urge-government-action-over-burma-army-offensives.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">military’s blockade of transport and aid in these areas</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> due to pre-election agreements with the military. Tensions and periodic violence seem unlikely to cease in 2017.</span></p>
<h1>4) Sudan</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Sudan is primed for significant violence against civilians in 2017, but much of it may remain out of the public spotlight. The Sudanese government has cut off access for journalists and aid workers to areas where it has conducted attacks on civilians, including much of Darfur, and </span><a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20401/darfur-s-conflict-might-be-forgotten-but-it-s-not-over"><span style="font-weight: 400;">many believe violence in Darfur may be returning towards levels from the height of the conflict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Huge numbers of internally displaced people remain in Sudan with almost no access to aid and few means to support themselves. In addition to Darfur, the Sudanese government continues to bomb civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In an extremely alarming development in the conflict, </span><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/chemical-weapons-attacks-darfur/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Amnesty International also found evidence of 30 likely chemical attacks against civilians</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">f</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">r</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">o</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">m</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">J</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">a</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">n</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">u</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">a</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">r</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">y</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">t</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">o</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">S</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">e</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">p</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">t</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">e</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">m</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">b</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">e</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">r</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">2</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">0</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">1</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">6. There is unlikely to be any large reduction of violence in 2017, as peace talks have broken down and the government remains invested in crushing rebellion. Sudan is also facing reduced international pressure. </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/31/europes-new-best-friend-in-africa-is-an-indicted-genocidal-war-criminal/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Many European governments have proved willing to support Sudan in order to prevent refugees from reaching their shores</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, while the U.S. is rumored to be preparing to lift sanctions.</span></p>
<h1>5) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite recent progress, uncertainty over President Kabila’s willingness to step down as president suggests conflict could escalate in the country in 2017. Kabila is constitutionally mandated to step down after two terms, and his second term was mandated to end in December 2016. After his pasts effort to amend the constitution to allow a third term failed, Kabila implemented various measures to push back his exit date, frequently citing concerns about the country’s readiness to conduct elections. A </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-idUSKBN14J1LC"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent deal brokered by the Catholic Church</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> calls for President Kabila to step down and elections to be held by the end of 2017, but it is unclear whether Kabila will respect the deal. If he does not, violence will likely escalate as hundreds have already been killed in confrontations between police and protesters. </span><a href="http://africasacountry.com/2016/12/the-armed-conflict-lurking-in-the-countryside/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Armed groups outside urban areas have also used ongoing political uncertainty to gain influence and territory</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Meanwhile, the largest cause of civilian death in the DRC remains insurgencies in the country’s east, though these groups are far less powerful and are more splintered than they were at their peak.</span></p>
<h1>6) Yemen</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Though unlikely to escalate significantly, Yemen’s devastating conflict seems likely to grind on. </span><a href="http://www.dw.com/en/syria-and-yemen-gaping-wounds-in-the-middle-east/a-36963373"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The conflict has moved towards equilibrium</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> with no side strong enough to win, but both also unwilling to give up. On one side of the conflict is the former Yemeni government of Abd Mansur Hadi, heavily backed by a Saudi-led coalition. The Saudis are certain to continue their bombings, as they believe the defeat of the Hadi government would advantage their rival, Iran. The US continues to back the coalition, albeit more tentatively, as a </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/saudi-arabia-arms-sale-yemen-war.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent decision to block an arms sale signifies</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. For their part, Hadi’s government has little power but maintains some influence in the south. On the other side, the Houthi rebels maintain control of much of the country, including the capital Sana’a, but are struggling to govern. They remain in an </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ousted-after-the-arab-spring-a-former-dictator-is-back/2016/12/30/473d9fa1-3b7e-4c22-923f-a4d2e53e13c7_story.html?utm_term=.6e48938bc468"><span style="font-weight: 400;">uneasy alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and receive limited support from Iran. Saudi bombings have frequently hit civilians and the conflict has devastated the economy. Hunger is extremely widespread and the Saudi coalition has repeatedly blocked the delivery of aid, continuously bombing major ports and further threatening aid delivery.</span></p>
<h1>7) Burundi</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to seek what is considered by many to be an unconstitutional third term sparked recent conflict in Burundi. Although he is now securely placed in his third term, the situation is far from resolution. Extrajudicial executions continue and thousands have died throughout the course of the conflict. The conflict has remained primarily political rather than ethnic, but </span><a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-edges-closer-to-the-abyss-in-2016-69122"><span style="font-weight: 400;">there are signs that violence against Tutsi could increase</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The Burundian government’s decision to leave the International Criminal Court suggests that their human rights record will not soon improve, and </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/africa/burundi-assassination-emmanuel-niyonkuru.html?_r=0"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the recent assassination of a government official</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> also raises tensions. Peace talks have stalled since July, when the government pulled out of the talks. Opposition groups were upset last month when chief mediator, former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, </span><a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201612120417.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">urged them to look toward the 2020 elections</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, seeming to ignore their concerns about the 2015 election. In this context, talks seem unlikely to resume, as the opposition feels slighted, and Nkurunziza feels that he can retain power with no real resistance. An armed insurgency in exile remains capable of conducting attacks, though it holds relatively little power and is unlikely to seriously threaten Nkurunziza’s government. Still, as long as they are denied political rights there is the possibility that more opposition supporters will choose to use violence.</span></p>
<h1>8) Ethiopia</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ethiopia has suffered significant unrest over the last year after protests emerged in the Oromia region. Originally concentrated on feelings of underrepresentation and marginalization of the Oromo ethnic group, the protests have spread to the Amhara region and have given voice to discontent with the government. Long seen as a champion of an authoritarian development model, Ethiopia has cracked down heavily on the protests and shown few signs of a democratic opening. </span><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/ethiopia-after-a-year-of-protests-time-to-address-grave-human-rights-concerns/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Amnesty International has found</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that security forces have killed over 800 people since protests began in November 2015. </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/a-state-of-emergency-has-brought-calm-to-ethiopia-but-dont-be-fooled/2016/12/24/5e39882a-c6c0-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.270201d51b8f"><span style="font-weight: 400;">With the opposition also growing increasingly disillusioned with the potential for peaceful change</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, potential for violence in 2017 is high.</span></p>
<h1>9) Kenya</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">August’s elections could very well proceed successfully and represent democratic progress in Kenya, but they also hold significant potential for conflict. President Uhuru Kenyatta will be contested by Raila Odinga in a repeat of the 2013 election. In the 2007 election, Odinga’s defeat led to violence killing around 1,000 people, while the 2013 election remained quite peaceful. It is unclear which path 2017 will take, but there are warning signs that suggest potential violence. </span><a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Survey-shows-low-support-for-IEBC-and-Cord-demos/-/1056/3204960/-/jaqsgqz/-/index.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Trust in IEBC, the electoral commission, is low</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and blows to Kenyatta’s popularity may cause a highly competitive election. Further, despite demand, the Kenyatta government has struggled to provide reforms, and </span><a href="https://kenopalo.com/2016/06/07/five-things-you-should-know-about-the-ongoing-monday-protests-in-kenya/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">continued police brutality has incited protests</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and raised fears of a heavy-handed response in the case of post-election protests. In addition to national elections, 47 counties will also hold local elections, and as ethnic tensions in several parts of the country remain high, it will not take much for localized conflict to erupt.</span></p>
<h1>10) Zimbabwe</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">92-year old President Robert Mugabe’s insistence on staying in power after 36 years in charge threatens to spark conflict in Zimbabwe. 2016 already saw increased resistance to Mugabe, with protests gaining ground in the summer. </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/02/mugabe-last-stand-zimbabwe-protests/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Youth activists</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, often using social media to spread messages such as that of previously unknown </span><a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/16/world/zimbabwe-pastor-mawarire/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pastor Evan Mawawire</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">—the founder of the #ThisFlag movement to end corruption and increase government transparency and accountability—were at the heart of the protests. Police cracked down heavily on protesters, but calls continued to urge Mugabe to step down immediately, rather than wait for elections in 2018 when </span><a href="http://www.firstpost.com/world/at-92-zimbabwes-robert-mugabe-looks-to-elections-in-2018-3156178.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mugabe intends to run for re-election</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Ongoing </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/21/zimbabwes-currency-hail-mary/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">economic problems</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> have also damaged the popularity of Mugabe’s government. Still, the potential for Mugabe to be forced from power </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/15/why-a-hashtag-isnt-enough-for-a-revolution-in-zimbabwe/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">hinges on a number of uncertainties</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, including the strengthening of a divided opposition and the military’s loyalty to Mugabe. Two things remain quite a bit more certain: that Mugabe will not cede power easily and many Zimbabweans will wish he would.</span></p>
<p>&#8211;</p>
<p><a href="http://standnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/69.jpg"><img class=" wp-image-6981 size-thumbnail alignleft" src="http://standnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/69-150x150.jpg" alt="69" width="150" height="150" /></a><strong>Timmy Hirschel-Burns</strong> is a senior at Swarthmore College majoring in Political Science and is STAND’s Policy Coordinator. You can follow him on Twitter at <a href="https://twitter.com/TimH_B">@TimH_B</a>.</p>
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<p><em>Featured photo is by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/qa-syria-white-helmets-150819142324132.html">The White Helmets</a>.</em></p>
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		<title>Weekly News Brief 3/14/13</title>
		<link>https://standnow.org/2013/03/14/weekly-news-brief-31413/</link>
		<comments>https://standnow.org/2013/03/14/weekly-news-brief-31413/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2013 14:33:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mac Hamilton]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict Updates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[demilitarized buffer zone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drc]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national league for democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[south sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tripartite summit]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Burma Last weekend, the Myanmar opposition group the National League for Democracy (NLD) ended its party congress with Aung San Suu Kyi remaining its leader. The NLD has been struggling in...<a class="moretag" href="https://standnow.org/2013/03/14/weekly-news-brief-31413/"> Read more…</a>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Burma</strong></p>
<p>Last weekend, the Myanmar opposition group the National League for Democracy (NLD) ended its party congress with Aung San Suu Kyi remaining its leader. The NLD has been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/daw-aung-san-suu-kyi-seeks-to-revitalize-myanmar-opposition-party.html?_r=0" target="_blank">struggling in recent months</a> to deliver a unified message on specific policies and cope with an ever-increasing membership.</p>
<p>On Monday March 11 and Tuesday March 12, <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20130311-myanmar-government-kachin-rebels-renew-talks" target="_blank">Myanmar government officials met with Kachin representatives</a> from the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the Chinese town of Ruili. The meetings were the result of new rounds of talks held in February. The KIO are fighting for greater political autonomy within Burma. With more than 100,000 people displaced since fighting began in 2011, the conflict has tarnished Burma’s democratic reforms.</p>
<p>At Monday’s talks, the <a href="http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/29046" target="_blank">KIO rejected the Myanmar government’s request for a ceasefire</a>, claiming they wanted greater assurances and new, well-defined boundaries. A mutual ceasefire agreement has yet to be reached since fighting began in June 2011 after a 17-year-old ceasefire agreement broke down. However, on Tuesday, <a href="http://www.dvb.no/news/with-no-ceasefire-kachin-rebels-govt-to-increase-coordination/26937" target="_blank">both parties agreed to coordinate</a> on each other’s troop movements to help reduce violence and “tensions” in areas of conflict, making way for a potential ceasefire agreement. Another round of talks is scheduled to take place within the next month.</p>
<p><strong>Sudan &amp; South Sudan</strong></p>
<p>Sudan and South Sudan have agreed to <a href="http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=11&amp;aid=1739&amp;dir=2013/March/Wednesday13" target="_blank">withdraw troops from contested border areas</a>, in the latest attempt to set up a demilitarized buffer zone. The deal states that the armed forces of both sides must be 10 kilometers from the border regions.  Both nations state that they have begun to withdraw troops, South Sudan specifying it should complete the movement by April 5th. The two countries have also agreed to resume the flow of southern oil exports through pipelines in Sudan within two weeks, more than a year after Juba shut down its entire output. As Sudan and South Sudan announced their moves to demilitarize the border, Khartoum&#8217;s forces said they clashed with rebels of the Sudan People&#8217;s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in Blue Nile.</p>
<p>Hundreds of South Sudanese citizens and political leaders converged on Bor, the capital of Jonglei state, to <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45759" target="_blank">celebrate International Women’s Day on Friday</a>, where speakers called for an end to early marriage and violence against women in the world’s youngest country.  <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-rullo/child-forced-marriage-south-sudan_b_2828349.html" target="_blank">Child and forced marriage is particularly widespread in South Sudan</a> where nearly half of women between the ages of 15 and 19 are married &#8211; some as young as 12.  The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement stated that <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201303130393.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&amp;utm_medium=twitter" target="_blank">25% of government seats should be filled by women</a>, although the SPLM, the ruling party in South Sudan, struggled to fill this quota, largely due to low literacy rates especially among women (70%).</p>
<p>On March 8, Hilde Johnson, special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General and <a href="http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-un-s-hilde-johnson-details-south-sudan-peacekeeping-mission" target="_blank">head of the U.N. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), detailed the Mission’s work as state-builders and the challenges it faces</a> at a discourse held at the United States Institute of Peace. Some of the challenges include logistical issues of poor transportation systems, low funding and resources, and misunderstandings between the UN Mission and the South Sudanese citizens. Despite these difficulties, UNMISS successfully moved forces into Pibor of Jonglei state to protect civilians from rebel forces by strengthening the South Sudanese army twice since independence.</p>
<p><strong>Syria</strong></p>
<p>Western diplomats have stated <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-syria-crisis-iran-idUSBRE92D05U20130314" target="_blank">that Iran has stepped up arms support</a> for the Assad regime in recent months. According to these diplomats, Iran has chiefly shipped arms to the Assad regime through Iraqi airspace and territory, although Iraqi officials deny this. It was also reported that some Iranian arms are flying through Turkish airspace before landing in Lebanon, where they are used to supply the Assad regime and its affiliated militias. Turkish officials denied any such activity in Turkish airspace. On Thursday, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced that <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20130314-paris-says-france-britain-prepared-arm-syria-rebels" target="_blank">France and Britain are now prepared to begin arming Syrian rebels</a> even without unanimous support from the European Union.</p>
<p>An increasingly desperate Assad <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/world/middleeast/signs-of-strain-on-syrias-military-build.html?pagewanted=all&amp;_r=1&amp;" target="_blank">regime has stepped up use of paramilitary groups, begun aggressively recruiting Christians, and used the top state-appointed Muslim cleric for recruitment</a>. The United States government has accused Iran of helping the Assad regime build the groups on the Iranian model of their Basij militias. In response to the enlistment of the top state-appointed Muslim cleric to recruit on behalf of the Assad regime, a group calling itself the Coalition of Free Alawite Youth announced on Tuesday that it would help Alawites flee to Turkey who did not wish to take up arms.</p>
<p>The United Nations announced Thursday that <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/un-agency-says-number-of-syria-refugees-is-up-by-10-percent-in-a-week-reaches-112-million/2013/03/14/738b5c0a-8c7f-11e2-adca-74ab31da3399_story.html" target="_blank">the amount of registered Syrian refugees jumped ten percent in just week</a> to exceed 1.1 million people. The increase in Syrian refugees correlates with reports coming from Amnesty International stating that the regime has increasingly used lethal battlefield weapons on residential areas in recent months.</p>
<p><strong>Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201303140845.html" target="_blank">A Tripartite Summit</a> with the presidents of Angola, South Africa, and Congo, began on Tuesday, aimed at discussing the situation in eastern Congo with an aim to implement the Framework Agreement for peace, stability and cooperation in Congo and the wider region.</p>
<p>According to Ugandan newspaper The New Vision, if the M23 agrees to lay down arms and sign a peace accord this week, the Congolese government <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201303121165.html" target="_blank">will grant them limited amnesty</a>and offer them positions in the national army. They also would speed up the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. Bertrand Bisimwa, the newly elected M23 political leader of the Makenga faction said he was not aware of such a deal. Think Africa Press offers a compelling analysis of divisions within the M23 rebel group <a href="http://thinkafricapress.com/drc/m23-implodes-rebel-factions-frustrate-kampala" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
<p>Because of ongoing instability and fighting in Goma and the Kivus, brothels have risen in number in the city. Many girls between the ages of 13 and 17 inhabit these brothels, many from the country, hoping to make money to send home to their families. For young girls, there are few alternatives to sex work to make money. Inter Press Service <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201303120844.html?viewall=1" target="_blank">reports here</a>. Deaths in detention centers have also <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201303131340.html" target="_blank">sharply risen</a> over the last year, nearly doubling from 56 in 2011 to 101 in 2012. Of the 101 deaths, 24 were from torture or ill-treatment, and others were due to poor conditions caused by overcrowding, malnutrition, and access to healthcare.</p>
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