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		<title>Top 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2017</title>
		<link>https://standnow.org/2017/01/03/conflictstowatch2017/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2017 20:13:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Timmy Hirschel-Burns]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burundi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aleppo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amhara]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amharic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amnesty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amnesty International]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arakan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aung San Suu Kyi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chemical weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[darfur]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democratic republic of the congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drc]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethiopia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hadi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic State]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kabila]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kachin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kenya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kenyatta]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kinshasa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kokang]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mkapa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mugabe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Myanmar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national league for democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nkurunziza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NLD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Odinga]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oromia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oromo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Panglong]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rakhine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RDC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[riek machar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rohingya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[salva kiir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[south sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SPLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SPLM-IO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ta'ang]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tatmadaw]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ThisFlag]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tutsi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[yemen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zimbabwe]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Predicting future atrocities is exceptionally difficult, as one must anticipate reactions from a variety of actors within complex systems. For those of us that use these forecasts to attempt to...<a class="moretag" href="https://standnow.org/2017/01/03/conflictstowatch2017/"> Read more…</a>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Predicting future atrocities is exceptionally difficult, as one must anticipate reactions from a variety of actors within complex systems. For those of us that use these forecasts to attempt to prevent atrocities, a successful response is one that prevents an atrocity that would have otherwise happened, thus making the forecasts look mistaken. Nevertheless, anticipating the future course of conflicts is a vital component of atrocity prevention, and forecasting efforts are growing increasingly sophisticated. The </span><a href="https://www.earlywarningproject.org/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Early Warning Project</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and</span><a href="http://www.cfr.org/conflict-assessment/preventive-priorities-survey-2017/p38562"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the Council on Foreign Relations Preventive Priorities Survey</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> are among the leading forecasts, and while we aren’t contributing a full forecast, it’s worth looking ahead to conflicts that could deteriorate or emerge in 2017 in order to assist prevention efforts. Civilians have often bore the brunt of conflicts, and sadly 2017 is unlikely to be different. </span></p>
<h1>1) Syria</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">2016 was a disastrous year for an already horrific conflict, as the Assad regime stepped up its use of sieges and as the fight for Aleppo last month became even harsher than many expected. The rebels are increasingly weak, particularly more moderate factions, and many rebels and civilians who were in formerly rebel-held territory, particularly around Aleppo, have been pushed into Idlib. The possibility remains that civilians that survived the brutal siege of Aleppo will once again face similar circumstances as the Syrian government and its allies push to retake further opposition territory. The U.S.,an increasingly peripheral player in the conflict, was left out of the most recent round of peace talks, and President-Elect Trump seems likely to withdraw support with the opposition and increase cooperation with Russia, a main ally of Assad. </span><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38473702"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Turkey has also become more cooperative with Russia</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and is now focusing on combatting Kurdish influence rather than supporting the opposition. Already struggling after </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/07/losing-ground-fighter-morale-is-it-all-over-for-isis-syria-turkey"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent territorial losses</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the Islamic State will also likely lose influence in 2017.</span></p>
<h1>2) South Sudan</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Having already caused immense suffering since its start in 2013, South Sudan’s civil war threatens to spiral even further in 2017. Originally caused by a split between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar, the SPLM-IO—Machar’s side—has split. Kiir appointed Taban Deng Gai to replace Machar as Vice President, and his decision to force Machar out of the country has left his supporters feeling unrepresented. The repeated failure of political negotiations has led many actors to see violence as their only route to power. </span><a href="http://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2016/11/25/genocidal-logic-south-sudan%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cgun-class%E2%80%9D?utm_content=buffere7e19&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ethnic divisions</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> have also solidified, </span><a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20785/does-any-party-in-south-sudan-have-the-will-to-prevent-genocide"><span style="font-weight: 400;">and the region of Equatoria in particular has seen increased violence</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This combination of factors has led to increasingly dire warnings, </span><a href="http://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2016/11/25/genocidal-logic-south-sudan%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cgun-class%E2%80%9D?utm_content=buffere7e19&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">with the UN announcing that ethnic cleansing is already underway</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The international response has been underwhelming, with the </span><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/outrage-blocks-south-sudan-arms-embargo-161223153844996.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UN unable to come to an agreement on a potential arms embargo</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<h1>3) Burma (Myanmar)</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Muslim ethnic minority group, the Rohingya, has long lived in dire conditions, stripped of citizenship and often forced to live in internally displaced people (IDP) camps. Described as the world’s group most at risk of genocide, there is an ever-lingering risk of a spark setting off mass violence. Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto leader of the country, </span><a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20432/troubling-signs-of-unrest-in-western-myanmar-threaten-suu-kyi-s-fragile-government"><span style="font-weight: 400;">and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have shown little interest in the Rohingya</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and seemingly lack the ability to control the military, who is in charge of managing the situation in Rakhine State. Security forces and members of the Rakhine ethnic group have both perpetrated violence against Rohingya, and </span><a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/12/09/what-does-the-bloodshed-in-rakhine-state-tell-us/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AsiaUnbound%2FJKurlantzick+%28Asia+Unbound+%C2%BB+Joshua+Kurlantzick%29"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the October killing of several police officers</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">—with a group of Rohingya accused to be the attackers—has raised tensions. There are also </span><a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/12/16/is-rakhine-state-home-to-a-growing-insurgency/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AsiaUnbound%2FJKurlantzick+%28Asia+Unbound+%C2%BB+Joshua+Kurlantzick%29"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reports</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that some Rohingya have reacted to their continued subjection through </span><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the creation of an insurgency</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. However, Rohingya know from experience that any violence they may perpetrate would likely lead to retaliation against Rohingya civilians. Reports of a plan among security forces to arm non-Muslim civilians also raise fears of increased violence. Should the situation deteriorate, almost no Burmese actors seem ready to come to the Rohingya’s defense. As the crisis continues, the government must reconsider its approach to the issue, build positive relations between the majority Buddhist and minority Muslim populations, and cease the use of excessive force against civilians, lest they precipitate the growth of a small number of Rohingya insurgents.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Additionally, ethnic groups around the country—such as the eastern </span><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-latest-ethnic-conflict-intensifies-as-violence-spreads-in-shan-state-a6928291.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Shan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><a href="http://karennews.org/2017/01/international-based-groups-denied-vote-at-knu-16th-congress-elections-congress-election-outcome-critical-to-how-knu-progresses-its-peace-plans.html/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Karen</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><a href="http://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/the-battle-for-gideon-a-kachin-perspective.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kokang</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and </span><a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/kachin-independence-army-teams-11212016141619.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kachin, Ta’ang, and Arakan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, now in an alliance—are politically sidelined and face violence at the hands of Myanmar government militias, even after Aung San Suu Kyi’s 21-Century Panglong Conference. There is speculation that the NLD is keeping quiet on the </span><a href="http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/civil-society-organizations-urge-government-action-over-burma-army-offensives.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">military’s blockade of transport and aid in these areas</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> due to pre-election agreements with the military. Tensions and periodic violence seem unlikely to cease in 2017.</span></p>
<h1>4) Sudan</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Sudan is primed for significant violence against civilians in 2017, but much of it may remain out of the public spotlight. The Sudanese government has cut off access for journalists and aid workers to areas where it has conducted attacks on civilians, including much of Darfur, and </span><a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20401/darfur-s-conflict-might-be-forgotten-but-it-s-not-over"><span style="font-weight: 400;">many believe violence in Darfur may be returning towards levels from the height of the conflict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Huge numbers of internally displaced people remain in Sudan with almost no access to aid and few means to support themselves. In addition to Darfur, the Sudanese government continues to bomb civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In an extremely alarming development in the conflict, </span><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/chemical-weapons-attacks-darfur/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Amnesty International also found evidence of 30 likely chemical attacks against civilians</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">f</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">r</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">o</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">m</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">J</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">a</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">n</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">u</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">a</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">r</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">y</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">t</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">o</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">S</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">e</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">p</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">t</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">e</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">m</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">b</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">e</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">r</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">2</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">0</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">1</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">6. There is unlikely to be any large reduction of violence in 2017, as peace talks have broken down and the government remains invested in crushing rebellion. Sudan is also facing reduced international pressure. </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/31/europes-new-best-friend-in-africa-is-an-indicted-genocidal-war-criminal/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Many European governments have proved willing to support Sudan in order to prevent refugees from reaching their shores</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, while the U.S. is rumored to be preparing to lift sanctions.</span></p>
<h1>5) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite recent progress, uncertainty over President Kabila’s willingness to step down as president suggests conflict could escalate in the country in 2017. Kabila is constitutionally mandated to step down after two terms, and his second term was mandated to end in December 2016. After his pasts effort to amend the constitution to allow a third term failed, Kabila implemented various measures to push back his exit date, frequently citing concerns about the country’s readiness to conduct elections. A </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-idUSKBN14J1LC"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent deal brokered by the Catholic Church</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> calls for President Kabila to step down and elections to be held by the end of 2017, but it is unclear whether Kabila will respect the deal. If he does not, violence will likely escalate as hundreds have already been killed in confrontations between police and protesters. </span><a href="http://africasacountry.com/2016/12/the-armed-conflict-lurking-in-the-countryside/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Armed groups outside urban areas have also used ongoing political uncertainty to gain influence and territory</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Meanwhile, the largest cause of civilian death in the DRC remains insurgencies in the country’s east, though these groups are far less powerful and are more splintered than they were at their peak.</span></p>
<h1>6) Yemen</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Though unlikely to escalate significantly, Yemen’s devastating conflict seems likely to grind on. </span><a href="http://www.dw.com/en/syria-and-yemen-gaping-wounds-in-the-middle-east/a-36963373"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The conflict has moved towards equilibrium</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> with no side strong enough to win, but both also unwilling to give up. On one side of the conflict is the former Yemeni government of Abd Mansur Hadi, heavily backed by a Saudi-led coalition. The Saudis are certain to continue their bombings, as they believe the defeat of the Hadi government would advantage their rival, Iran. The US continues to back the coalition, albeit more tentatively, as a </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/saudi-arabia-arms-sale-yemen-war.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent decision to block an arms sale signifies</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. For their part, Hadi’s government has little power but maintains some influence in the south. On the other side, the Houthi rebels maintain control of much of the country, including the capital Sana’a, but are struggling to govern. They remain in an </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ousted-after-the-arab-spring-a-former-dictator-is-back/2016/12/30/473d9fa1-3b7e-4c22-923f-a4d2e53e13c7_story.html?utm_term=.6e48938bc468"><span style="font-weight: 400;">uneasy alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and receive limited support from Iran. Saudi bombings have frequently hit civilians and the conflict has devastated the economy. Hunger is extremely widespread and the Saudi coalition has repeatedly blocked the delivery of aid, continuously bombing major ports and further threatening aid delivery.</span></p>
<h1>7) Burundi</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to seek what is considered by many to be an unconstitutional third term sparked recent conflict in Burundi. Although he is now securely placed in his third term, the situation is far from resolution. Extrajudicial executions continue and thousands have died throughout the course of the conflict. The conflict has remained primarily political rather than ethnic, but </span><a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-edges-closer-to-the-abyss-in-2016-69122"><span style="font-weight: 400;">there are signs that violence against Tutsi could increase</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. The Burundian government’s decision to leave the International Criminal Court suggests that their human rights record will not soon improve, and </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/africa/burundi-assassination-emmanuel-niyonkuru.html?_r=0"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the recent assassination of a government official</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> also raises tensions. Peace talks have stalled since July, when the government pulled out of the talks. Opposition groups were upset last month when chief mediator, former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, </span><a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201612120417.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">urged them to look toward the 2020 elections</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, seeming to ignore their concerns about the 2015 election. In this context, talks seem unlikely to resume, as the opposition feels slighted, and Nkurunziza feels that he can retain power with no real resistance. An armed insurgency in exile remains capable of conducting attacks, though it holds relatively little power and is unlikely to seriously threaten Nkurunziza’s government. Still, as long as they are denied political rights there is the possibility that more opposition supporters will choose to use violence.</span></p>
<h1>8) Ethiopia</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ethiopia has suffered significant unrest over the last year after protests emerged in the Oromia region. Originally concentrated on feelings of underrepresentation and marginalization of the Oromo ethnic group, the protests have spread to the Amhara region and have given voice to discontent with the government. Long seen as a champion of an authoritarian development model, Ethiopia has cracked down heavily on the protests and shown few signs of a democratic opening. </span><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/ethiopia-after-a-year-of-protests-time-to-address-grave-human-rights-concerns/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Amnesty International has found</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that security forces have killed over 800 people since protests began in November 2015. </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/a-state-of-emergency-has-brought-calm-to-ethiopia-but-dont-be-fooled/2016/12/24/5e39882a-c6c0-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.270201d51b8f"><span style="font-weight: 400;">With the opposition also growing increasingly disillusioned with the potential for peaceful change</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, potential for violence in 2017 is high.</span></p>
<h1>9) Kenya</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">August’s elections could very well proceed successfully and represent democratic progress in Kenya, but they also hold significant potential for conflict. President Uhuru Kenyatta will be contested by Raila Odinga in a repeat of the 2013 election. In the 2007 election, Odinga’s defeat led to violence killing around 1,000 people, while the 2013 election remained quite peaceful. It is unclear which path 2017 will take, but there are warning signs that suggest potential violence. </span><a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Survey-shows-low-support-for-IEBC-and-Cord-demos/-/1056/3204960/-/jaqsgqz/-/index.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Trust in IEBC, the electoral commission, is low</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and blows to Kenyatta’s popularity may cause a highly competitive election. Further, despite demand, the Kenyatta government has struggled to provide reforms, and </span><a href="https://kenopalo.com/2016/06/07/five-things-you-should-know-about-the-ongoing-monday-protests-in-kenya/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">continued police brutality has incited protests</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and raised fears of a heavy-handed response in the case of post-election protests. In addition to national elections, 47 counties will also hold local elections, and as ethnic tensions in several parts of the country remain high, it will not take much for localized conflict to erupt.</span></p>
<h1>10) Zimbabwe</h1>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">92-year old President Robert Mugabe’s insistence on staying in power after 36 years in charge threatens to spark conflict in Zimbabwe. 2016 already saw increased resistance to Mugabe, with protests gaining ground in the summer. </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/02/mugabe-last-stand-zimbabwe-protests/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Youth activists</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, often using social media to spread messages such as that of previously unknown </span><a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/16/world/zimbabwe-pastor-mawarire/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pastor Evan Mawawire</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">—the founder of the #ThisFlag movement to end corruption and increase government transparency and accountability—were at the heart of the protests. Police cracked down heavily on protesters, but calls continued to urge Mugabe to step down immediately, rather than wait for elections in 2018 when </span><a href="http://www.firstpost.com/world/at-92-zimbabwes-robert-mugabe-looks-to-elections-in-2018-3156178.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mugabe intends to run for re-election</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Ongoing </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/21/zimbabwes-currency-hail-mary/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">economic problems</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> have also damaged the popularity of Mugabe’s government. Still, the potential for Mugabe to be forced from power </span><a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/15/why-a-hashtag-isnt-enough-for-a-revolution-in-zimbabwe/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">hinges on a number of uncertainties</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, including the strengthening of a divided opposition and the military’s loyalty to Mugabe. Two things remain quite a bit more certain: that Mugabe will not cede power easily and many Zimbabweans will wish he would.</span></p>
<p>&#8211;</p>
<p><a href="http://standnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/69.jpg"><img class=" wp-image-6981 size-thumbnail alignleft" src="http://standnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/69-150x150.jpg" alt="69" width="150" height="150" /></a><strong>Timmy Hirschel-Burns</strong> is a senior at Swarthmore College majoring in Political Science and is STAND’s Policy Coordinator. You can follow him on Twitter at <a href="https://twitter.com/TimH_B">@TimH_B</a>.</p>
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<p><em>Featured photo is by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/qa-syria-white-helmets-150819142324132.html">The White Helmets</a>.</em></p>
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		<title>Adding Nuance to the Peace vs. Justice Debate</title>
		<link>https://standnow.org/2013/05/10/adding-nuance-to-the-peace-vs-justice-debate/</link>
		<comments>https://standnow.org/2013/05/10/adding-nuance-to-the-peace-vs-justice-debate/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 20:01:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sonia Sen]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[justice]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kenya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://standnow.org/?p=5385</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This piece, written by Danny Hirschel-Burns, from Swarthmore College STAND, originally appeared on his blog The Widening Lens.   The peace versus justice debate is unavoidable when it comes to the...<a class="moretag" href="https://standnow.org/2013/05/10/adding-nuance-to-the-peace-vs-justice-debate/"> Read more…</a>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>This piece, written by Danny Hirschel-Burns, from Swarthmore College STAND, originally appeared on his blog <a href="http://thewideninglens.wordpress.com/2013/04/29/adding-nuance-to-the-peace-vs-justice-debate//" target="_blank">The Widening Lens</a>.</i></p>
<div><i> </i></p>
<p style="display: inline !important;">The peace versus justice debate is unavoidable when it comes to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The conversation goes something like: Team Peace argues that the immediate cessation of violent conflict has to take precedence over everything else, while Team Justice argues that ending impunity for human rights violations is crucial for deterrence against human rights violations in the future.  While this summary totally simplifies a complicated and multipolar conversation, these two camps shape the basic nature of the debate.  Though both have solid points, a messy, subjective truth lies somewhere in the middle and the effects of justice are heavily dependent on the specific situation.</p>
<p style="display: inline !important;">
<p style="display: inline !important;">
<p>While the division between peace and justice is not rock-solid, there are indeed real problems with pursuing justice over peace (<a href="http://thewideninglens.wordpress.com/2012/10/06/negotiation-vs-justice-strategies-on-legally-combating-gang-violence-and-mass-atrocities/" target="_blank">a theme I’ve written about before</a>).  A perfect example is Sudan.  The ICC’s arrest warrant against President Omar al-Bashir increases his need to stay in a position of power (though he says <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article38061" target="_blank">he will step down in 2015</a> this is probably more of a result of <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/20121023151652134610.html" target="_blank">internal NCP politics</a> and he certainly has no intention of handing himself over to the ICC), and has decreased his ability to participate in negotiations.  This fact decreases the possible avenues of engagement for the international community (to varying degrees depending on the actor) to bargain with Bashir, ultimately hampering the opportunities for an international tempering influence, which his is especially unfortunate given Bashir’s current <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/its-basically-over-the-sudanese-dictatorships-dwindling-options/264406/" target="_blank">position of weakness</a>.</div>
<div>
<p>Another example of unintended ICC consequences is in Kenya, where ICC-charged duo <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uhuru_Kenyatta" target="_blank">Uhuru Kenyatta</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Ruto" target="_blank">William Ruto</a> were essentially <a href="http://themonkeycage.org/2013/04/02/how-is-the-icc-supposed-to-work/#more-28916" target="_blank">brought together as a political unit</a>because of their respective warrants that date back to <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/137-kenya-in-crisis.aspx" target="_blank">the election violence in 2007-2008</a>.  Ruto and Kenyatta were able to use their confrontation with the ICC as <a href="http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/kenyatta-rutu-ticket-past-kikuyu-kalenjin" target="_blank">a symbol of their resistance against foreign influence</a>, consequently gaining them votes.  Their ticket eventually won the Kenyan elections (though there seems to also be evidence that the ICC helped convince Kenyatta and Ruto to call for calm before and after the election), and Kenyatta is now the second head of state to have been summoned by the ICC.  Unlike Bashir however, Kenyatta has cooperated with The Hague thus far.</p>
<p><img alt="" src="http://standnow.org/files/peacejustice.jpg" width="300" height="200" align="left" />So while there are real downsides <a href="https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?URI=www-nc.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/opinion/global/the-role-of-the-icc-in-international-justice-and-diplomacy.html&amp;REFUSE_COOKIE_ERROR=SHOW_ERROR" target="_blank">to justice over peace</a>, there are also plenty of benefits from a justice-centered approach.  <a href="http://themonkeycage.org/2013/04/02/the-icc-deterrence-and-amnesty/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+themonkeycagefeed+%28The+Monkey+Cage%29" target="_blank">As Erik Voeten points out in his Monkey Cage post</a>, the ICC is very effective in deterring human rights abuses in countries where “mid-level” human rights abuses take place.  Also, the ICC is quite good at influencing mid-level individuals.  While Bashir, as Sudan’s leader, is out of the ICC’s reach, mid-level individuals in security forces and rebel groups worldwide are much more expendable, and they know that if a higher-up decides they’re a liability because of the atrocities they’ve committed, they’ll be on the next plane to The Hague.  The threat of ICC prosecution, for example, had <a href="http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Colombia-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf" target="_blank">a positive effect in Colombia</a>, and the institution is quite effective at <a href="http://themonkeycage.org/2013/04/08/deterring-torture-and-the-icc/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+themonkeycagefeed+%28The+Monkey+Cage%29" target="_blank">deterring torture</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately though, the existence of the ICC does little to deter <a href="http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/44/4/407.short" target="_blank">the most egregious human rights violations</a>.  Individuals like Assad, Bashir, and Gaddafi have never been cowed by threats of eventual justice.  Keeping power outweighs any potential risks.  Conversely though, the existence of the ICC does not encourage human rights violations <a href="http://themonkeycage.org/2013/04/02/how-is-the-icc-supposed-to-work/#more-28916" target="_blank">as James Fearson argued</a>.  While it is supposed to, the ICC does not really close off all escape routes (they’ve never been in short supply anyway) for human rights violators, but these escape routes, in the end, have little effect on the level of human rights violations committed.  It is not as if Assad is being encouraged to kill as many people as possible before escaping to the ICC; leaders like Assad and Gaddafi never had any intention of pulling the escape cord when it looked like they have a credible chance of losing.  While the ICC can do little to prevent leaders bent on maintaining power through any means necessary from doing so, it can at least provide a just conclusion to some of these cases (<a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/22/dr-congo-bosco-ntaganda-s-trail-atrocities-ends-icc" target="_blank">Bosco Ntaganda is a good example</a>), an outcome which shouldn’t be trivialized.</p>
<p>Justice and peace and not mutual exclusive phenomena, and while one can sometimes endanger the other, the specific context of each situation must always be taken into account before making a policy recommendation.  Ultimately, this is a debate that the ICC will have to enter to an increasing degree in coming years.  While it has made <a href="http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/02/27/a-fatal-attraction-the-un-security-council-and-the-relationship-between-r2p-and-the-international-criminal-court/" target="_blank">some progress</a>, it must to do more to address the problems that come with an inflexible, justice-centered approach.  Luckily, it does have the tools to do that.  Article 53 of the Rome Statute, the founding document of the ICC, allows for the Chief Prosecutor to offer amnesty to a perpetrator in the interests of the victims.  This precedent should not be applied in every situation, but does potentially allow the ICC to take a more critical approach to its activities.  The ICC has certainly been a milestone achievement in the fight to end international impunity for large-scale human rights violations, but it is not without its problems.</p>
</div>
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		<title>What to Expect When You&#8217;re Expecting: Civilian Protection Crises to Watch in 2013</title>
		<link>https://standnow.org/2013/01/08/what-to-expect-when-youre-expecting-civilian-protection-crises-to-watch-in-2013/</link>
		<comments>https://standnow.org/2013/01/08/what-to-expect-when-youre-expecting-civilian-protection-crises-to-watch-in-2013/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2013 20:51:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mac Hamilton]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[boko haram]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cartel violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electoral violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kenya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mexico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[south sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://standnow.org/?p=4907</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It’s 2013. For conflict analysts, the new year is a time for lists. In particular, those ubiquitous lists of “conflicts to watch,” which seem to pop up on the regular....<a class="moretag" href="https://standnow.org/2013/01/08/what-to-expect-when-youre-expecting-civilian-protection-crises-to-watch-in-2013/"> Read more…</a>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It’s 2013. For conflict analysts, the new year is a time for lists. In particular, those ubiquitous lists of “conflicts to watch,” which seem to pop up on the regular. While not “scientific,” per se, these lists provide a useful insight into policy priorities: both what policymakers are looking at, and what various organizations think they should be looking at. As STAND policy analyst Danny Hirschel-Burns, who made his own “conflicts to watch” list, observed, the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/conflict-prevention/preventive-priorities-survey-2013/p29673" target="_blank">Council on Foreign Relations’</a> (CFR) and the <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/27/10_conflicts_to_watch_in_2013?wp_login_redirect=0" target="_blank">International Crisis Group’s</a>(ICG) lists stuck out. CFR’s Preventive Priorities Survey, which spans the U.S. policy community, highlights key points of overlap between U.S. strategic interests and regional instability, whereas ICG’s watchlist identifies opportunities for conflict prevention.</p>
<p>As STAND moves into a new stage as an independent, self-sustaining organization, we’ll continue to advocate for human rights in our existing areas of concern: Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, and Syria. Given our global scope, however, we’re keeping our eyes peeled for additional opportunities to highlight civilian protection in U.S. foreign policy worldwide. In 2013, here are a few civilian protection crises that we’ll be watching.</p>
<h3>Civil War in Syria</h3>
<p>With both sides in Syria continually failing to reach political agreements, it seems unlikely that the Syrian civil war will find an end without thousands of more civilian deaths. As Syria reaches its two year mark, the opposition is gaining ground and the regime is slowly eroding. However, even if the regime falls, it is unlikely that peace will be found with the opposition in its current state. Today, the West seems more likely than ever to support the opposition, which could hasten the opposition’s control. As the Syrian regime becomes more desperate, the fear of chemical weapon use by both sides will become more salient, and an international intervention will become more likely.</p>
<h3>Ethnic Violence in Nigeria</h3>
<p>Nigeria’s violence represents a confluence of crises, many of which have plagued the country throughout its decade-and-a-half management of civilian rule. Throughout the past three years, the Nigerian government has struggled to contain the domestic consequences of Boko Haram, an Islamist insurgency which has emerged from Nigeria’s marginalized northern provinces. As Boko Haram’s operations fragment, and its attacks on civilian and military targets creep further south, Abuja will struggle to contain the organization’s impact on inter-communal violence in central Nigeria’s volatile Middle Belt region. To complicate matters, security services appear unable to uphold a civilian protection mandate, leaving civilians throughout northern Nigeria in the crosshairs.</p>
<h3>Political Divisions in Sudan</h3>
<p>Discontent in Sudan, both within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has been growing throughout 2012. The Sudanese government has cracked down on growing revolts in Khartoum over rising costs of living, targeting students protesting austerity measures, rising tuition costs, violence against female Darfuri students, and the recent murder of four male Darfuri students. The crackdown against peaceful protesters, the swift response to a possible coup attempt in late November, and the NCP’s political divisions show state weakness and point to more repression in the coming year. In addition to political tensions within the NCP, Khartoum continues to fight the Sudan Revolutionary Front, limiting access to humanitarian aid organizations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians into South Sudan.</p>
<h3>State-Building in South Sudan</h3>
<p>As the world’s newest state, South Sudan has witnessed border conflict with neighboring Sudan, inter-communal violence, and civilian discontent with state services. South Sudan’s Upper Nile and Unity states are home to approximately 200,000 refugees from Sudan’s South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and conflict in South Sudan’s Jonglei State, caused by climate change and localized militarization, has internally displaced approximately 80,000 people. In addition to managing refugee and IDP influx, in 2013, South Sudan will need to improve its basic infrastructure, strengthen security, carry out a civilian disarmament campaign, and reach an agreement with Sudan on citizenship issues. Widespread poverty and South Sudan’s lack of funds for infrastructure and assistance are obstacles to these goals.</p>
<h3>Continuing Instability in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo</h3>
<p>The M23 group in the eastern DRC, allegedly backed by bordering Rwanda and Uganda, has increased human rights abuses and internal displacement in the east, leading to the M23 takeover of Goma in late November. While peace talks have been initiated, violence in the region remains rampant, and the Congolese government does not have the capacity to address the longstanding security and governance issues that the east faces. Without a meaningful commitment to political and governance reform by the DRC government and with the continued meddling of Kigali in eastern Congo, the situation will likely continue in 2013.</p>
<h3>Cartel Violence in Mexico</h3>
<p>As we’ve observed, Mexico’s cartel violence is a challenging case for atrocity prevention advocates: clashes between cartels, as well as between cartels and Mexican security forces, appear criminal, yet mirror the scope and scale of civil conflicts elsewhere. Mexico’s cartel conflicts occur in the context of trans-regional drug trafficking, as well as the U.S. government’s efforts to limit the domestic reach of the illicit narcotics trade. Mexico’s new President Enrique Pena Nieto has indicated an interest in diffusing the country’s crisis, but has remained ambiguous on particular steps towards mitigating violent clashes between cartels and the security services. U.S. politics may also prove a decisive factor, as the second Obama administration ponders the implications of Colorado and Washington’s recent marijuana legalization referenda for domestic and international drug policy.</p>
<h3>Electoral Violence in Kenya</h3>
<p>During the three-month aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 presidential polls, a corrosive mix of elite competition and popular mobilization facilitated a devastating wave of electoral violence, which continues to drive Kenyan politics in 2013. As Kenya heads towards its next presidential contest, which will likely occur in March, the atrocity prevention community is looking for early warning signs of conflict outbreak. The Kenyan state appears incapable of containing outbreaks of violence at the local level, such as the recent inter-communal clashes in the coastal Tana River Delta. While post-2007 reforms have encouraged broader accountability within Kenyan politics, two International Criminal Court indictees, William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, remain active participants in the current race.</p>
<h3>Tentative Reforms in Burma</h3>
<p>In the past year, Burma has undergone a series of political, economic and administrative reforms at the hands of the Myanmar government. Political prisoners have been released, labor laws introduced, censorship relaxed, and an independent National Human Rights Commission convened. While these signs are heartening, conflict between the Kachin and the Myanmar military continues in the north and the government seems to have little interest in negotiating peace between the Rakhine and Rohingya in the west. In light of the country’s recent reforms, the US has eased up on sanctions, and it will be important to protect resource-rich minority areas from entering corporate power.</p>
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		<title>Weekly News Brief, 3.26.10 &#8211; 4.2.10</title>
		<link>https://standnow.org/2010/04/03/weekly-news-brief-3-26-10-4-2-10/</link>
		<comments>https://standnow.org/2010/04/03/weekly-news-brief-3-26-10-4-2-10/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Apr 2010 13:38:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jackielewis]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict Updates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democratic republic of the congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emerging conflicts]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[kenya]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[weekly news brief]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false"></guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><i>In this week's issue:</i> <i>Opposition parties have withdrawn from Sudan's presidential elections;</i> <i>Burma's NLD party has voted not to participate in elections;</i> <i>Human Right's Watch released a report documenting more attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army in Congo</i></p><p><b><span>Weekly  News Brief, March 26 to April 2, 2010, </span></b><span>compiled by Joshua Kennedy and the STAND E-team. To receive news briefs, trivia, and discussion guides, email education@standnow.org.</span><b><span><br /></span></b></p>  <p><b><span>Areas of  Concern</span></b></p>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>In this week&#8217;s issue:</i> <i>Opposition parties have withdrawn from Sudan&#8217;s presidential elections;</i> <i>Burma&#8217;s NLD party has voted not to participate in elections;</i> <i>Human Right&#8217;s Watch released a report documenting more attacks by the Lord&#8217;s Resistance Army in Congo</i></p>
<p><b><span>Weekly News Brief, March 26 to April 2, 2010, </span></b><span>compiled by Joshua Kennedy and the STAND E-team. To receive news briefs, trivia, and discussion guides, email education@standnow.org.</span><b><span><br />
</span></b></p>
<p><b><span>Areas of Concern</span></b></p>
<div><b>Sudan</b></div>
<div><b>Election-related news</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span>The upcoming national elections have been thrown into doubt, as the <a href="http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6301TA.htm" target="_blank"><span>SPLM, Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party and Sudanese Communist Party have withdrawn from the coming presidential election due to widespread fraud</span></a>. As the situation is still evolving, including <a href="http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6310BX.htm" target="_blank"><span>ongoing uncertainty over the participation of these parties in the parliamentary and local elections</span></a>. </span></li>
<li><span>As of Friday afternoon, the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8601160.stm" target="_blank"><span>Umma party (led by former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi) set a Tuesday deadline for the government</span></a> to agree to postpone the elections for four weeks to prepare an oversight body for the reportedly biased National Election Commission or the Umma Party will boycott the election at all levels.</span></li>
<li><span><a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6601&amp;l=1" target="_blank"><span><span style="color: #800080;">ICG released a new report charging that the ruling National Congress Party has attempted to rig the elections</span></span></a> through the gerrymandering of electoral districts, altering census results, purchasing tribal loyalties and co-opting traditional leaders among other strategies. Read the <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=4353&amp;tid=6601&amp;l=1" target="_blank">full report here</a>. </span></li>
<li><span><span>South Sudanese police </span></span><span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/29/AR2010032901162.html" target="_blank"><span><span style="color: #800080;">arrested and severely beat seven members</span></span></a><span><span> of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement for Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), the only party running a candidate against Salva Kiir for President of South Sudan. </span></span></span></li>
<li><span>The ICC chief prosecutor declared that the upcoming elections could possibly legitimize President al-Bashir’s rule,<a href="http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/23/sudan_elections_put_un_us_in_an_awkward_spot" target="_blank"><span><span style="color: #800080;"> leaving the UN and the US in a very politically challenging situation,</span></span></a> regarding al-Bashir’s prosecution at the ICC.</span></li>
<li><span>Former Ghanaian President <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34620" target="_blank"><span>John Kufuor will lead the African Union’s 58-person election monitoring team</span></a> in Sudan.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><b><span>Non-election related news</span></b></p>
<ul>
<li><span><a href="http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-8424KU?OpenDocument&amp;rc=1&amp;cc=sdn" target="_blank"><span>UNAMID is preparing to assist 30,000 newly displaced persons</span></a> in South Darfur, who have fled their homes due to violence between the Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes.</span></li>
<li><span><a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34587" target="_blank"><span>JEM rebels have said that they are prepared for peace talks</span></a> with the Sudanese government in Doha, Qatar. The reported sticking points in the coming talks appear to revolve the inclusion of JEM in a power-sharing agreement. In related news, Joint Chief Mediator <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34608" target="_blank"><span>Djibril Bassole said that a peace agreement in Doha is unlikely to be signed before the elections on April 11</span></a>.</span></li>
<li><span>Sudanese police completely destroyed a displaced persons camp outside of Khartoum, bulldozing dozens of homes and <a href="http://english.ntdtv.com/ntdtv_en/ns_me/2010-03-24/579193563922.html" target="_blank"><span><span style="color: #800080;">restricting the access to fresh food and water.</span></span></a></span></li>
<li><span><span>UNMIS military convoys sent to monitor the peace are </span></span><span><a href="http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88568" target="_blank"><span>encountering violent attacks, unexploded mines in their campsites, and other dangerous situations</span></a><span><span> in South Sudan. </span></span></span></li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<div><b>Burma</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span>Businessmen in the Wa region <a title="blocked::http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18120" href="http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18120" target="_blank"><span><span style="color: #800080;">have begun to evacuate </span></span></a>as tensions between the United Wa State Army and the Burmese military rise over the issue of joining the Border Guard Force.  The regime has also ordered that<a title="blocked::http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/3719-government-employees-sent-on-long-leave-in-wa-area-.html" href="http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/3719-government-employees-sent-on-long-leave-in-wa-area-.html" target="_blank"><span> government employees in the region</span></a> go on long leave, and military preparations are occurring on both sides.</span></li>
<li><span>The National League for Democracy has voted<a title="blocked::http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18143" href="http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18143" target="_blank"><span> not to register in the 2010 elections</span></a>, following Aung San Suu Kyi’s wishes that the party not participate under unjust election laws.  The decision calls the future of the party into question as it could lead to the party’s marginalization or dissolution.</span></li>
<li><span>Nine US senators have urged President Barack Obama to <a title="blocked::http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18162" href="http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18162" target="_blank"><span>appoint a special US representative</span></a> for Burma and impose additional economic sanctions on the military junta under the Jade Act as a response to the junta&#8217;s release of &#8220;profoundly troubling election laws.&#8221;</span></li>
<li><span>600 Karen refugees have <a title="blocked::http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18172" href="http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18172" target="_blank">returned to Burma</a> from Thailand under heavy pressure from the Thai government. The refugees face landmines, forced labor, and army recruitment, and many human rights groups have protested the resettlement.</span></li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<div><b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span><a href="http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/28/dr-congo-lord-s-resistance-army-rampage-kills-321" target="_blank"><span>Human Rights Watch released a new report</span></a> documenting another set of Lord’s Resistance Army attacks in the northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo. An estimated 321 civilians were killed when the LRA rampaged through the Makombo area of Haut-Uele district during a four day period in December. </span></li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<div><b>Afghanistan</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span>A UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights report said <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8595258.stm" target="_blank"><span><span style="color: #800080;">widespread corruption in Afghanistan is deepening the country’s poverty and contributing to the neglect of human rights</span></span></a>. The report urged the international community to focus on the country’s long-term development. </span></li>
<li><span>The <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-03/29/c_13229069.htm" target="_blank"><span>Taliban claimed responsibility for shooting down a NATO helicopter</span></a> that crashed in southern Afghanistan on Monday morning. </span></li>
<li><span>As U.S. forces prepare for the next major Afghan offensive in Kandahar, Taliban militants have already <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/asia/27kandahar.html" target="_blank"><span>turned the area into a battle zone</span></a>. </span></li>
<li><span><a href="http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Bombs-Kill-6-Civilians-in-Afghanistan-89354932.html" target="_blank"><span>Six civilians were killed</span></a> on a roadside blast in southern Afghanistan on Saturday. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/03/31/world/international-uk-afghanistan-violence.html" target="_blank"><span>At least eight civilians were killed</span></a> when a bomb went off in a busy marketplace Wednesday, also injuring 38.</span></li>
</ul>
<div><b> </b></div>
<div><b>Iraq</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span>Former interim prime minister Ayad <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032602196.html" target="_blank"><span>Allawi’s party won the most parliamentary seats</span></a> in Iraq’s elections, <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g6yZX1Zjrr7k_qgkYBRbqTFybzqAD9EMJ7P00" target="_blank"><span>winning two more seats</span></a> than his rival, current prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. Allawi, who ran on a secular platform, is still short of a majority and will need to form a coalition government, which may take months. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html" target="_blank"><span>Maliki has vowed to challenge</span></a> the election results in court. The number of seats may also change as an <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/29/AR2010032901358.html" target="_blank"><span>Iraqi commission seeks to invalidate the votes of six people who won and of 46 other candidates</span></a> it says are tied to Saddam Hussein’s banned Baath party. </span></li>
<li><span>A series of IED <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8591546.stm" target="_blank"><span>explosives blasted a tribal leader’s house</span></a> in Anbar province, killing six and injuring 33. <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8593409.stm" target="_blank"><span>A double car bombing in Karbala killed another five</span></a>, seemingly targeting the Shiite pilgrims who frequented the restaurant bombed. </span></li>
</ul>
<div><b> </b></div>
<div><b>Pakistan</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span><a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/03/29/pakistan.violence/?hpt=Sbin" target="_blank"><span>At least 26 militants were killed</span></a> in clashes between government forces and militants Monday. <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hn9Oneu76Qo756LjqRrCNKUo-bZg" target="_blank"><span>Suicide bombers killed three anti-militia men</span></a> and wounded another 10 in northwest Pakistan that same day. Some accounts say <a href="http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Pakistani-Troops-Kill-84-Taliban-Fighters-89277487.html" target="_blank"><span>Pakistan forces have killed 84 militants</span></a> over two days last week.</span></li>
<li><span><a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iXKDw0vWQomHE9ISJeMypJ45pgOA" target="_blank"><span>U.S. drones killed six militants</span></a> in tribal areas in northwest Pakistan on Wednesday. </span></li>
</ul>
<div><b> </b></div>
<div><b>Somalia</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span>Aid workers in Somalia say the relief <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88605" target="_blank"><span>situation is currently “at its worst” and food is rapidly running out</span></a>, due to the withdrawal of aid agencies because of security and corruption concerns despite thousands displaced by recent fighting. </span></li>
<li><span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032600887.html" target="_blank"><span>Hundreds of families living near Mogadishu’s airport were evicted</span></a> as the government attempts to secure its tenuous hold over the few blocks of the capital it still controls. <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g7OaI4_kjeHA-o4UhlmP7vlWmrrwD9EMUBN01" target="_blank"><span>Three people were killed last Monday as they protested</span></a> government demolition of their houses near the airport. </span></li>
<li><span><a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=121832&amp;sectionid=351020501" target="_blank"><span><span style="color: #800080;">At least 17 people died</span></span></a> in Saturday’s fighting between Somali government and rebels in Mogadishu. In central Somalia, <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE62U0FX20100331" target="_blank"><span>clan warfare killed 16 people</span></a>. </span></li>
<li><span>An <a href="http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGNAU2010032516009&amp;lang=e" target="_blank"><span>Amnesty International report</span></a> released last week highlighted the human rights abuses suffered by Somali civilians, especially those in the capital. </span></li>
<li><span><a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g7OaI4_kjeHA-o4UhlmP7vlWmrrwD9EP2LIO0" target="_blank"><span>Kenya refused the TFG’s request to deploy Somali troops</span></a> trained in Kenya to Mogadishu to launch a major offensive against al-Shabaab; Kenya rejected the request citing security concerns over the porous Kenya-Somalia border. A Kenyan official has also <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88605" target="_blank"><span>denied that Kenyan citizens are fighting with the al-Shabaab</span></a> in Somalia, as a UN report has alleged. </span></li>
<li><span>Ahlu Sunna Waljama&#8217;a, a moderate Sufi militia group allied with the government, has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62R0PS20100328" target="_blank"><span>pledged to battle al Shabaab and remove radical Islamists</span></a> from Somalia. An al-Shabaab spokesman said that they <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201003290782.html" target="_blank"><span>opposed the peace agreement</span></a>, it would not interfere their struggle to control all of Somalia. </span></li>
<li><span>Somali <a href="http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=15583&amp;tirsan=3" target="_blank"><span>president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed met with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon</span></a> in Libya on Sunday. The leaders discussed the myriad challenges facing Somalia. </span></li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<p><b><span>Sri Lanka</span></b></p>
<ul>
<li><span>The UN has <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/srilanka/1-9-lakh-Tamils-resettled-yet-no-relief-in-sight/Article1-524454.aspx" target="_blank"><span>suspended distribution of aid for Tamil refugees</span></a> due to a shortfall of funding. </span></li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<p><b><span>Around the World</span></b></p>
<div><b>Kenya</b></div>
<ul>
<li><span>The <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8597211.stm" target="_blank"><span>International Criminal Court has authorized an investigation into the 2007 electoral violence in Kenya</span></a> that killed more than 1,300 people in the course of a few weeks. The ICC’s judges ruled that there is “a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed on Kenyan territory.”</span></li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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