Nkurunziza had been hinting at a third term for many months.  His party maintained that he was eligible as he had been elected by Parliament, rather than voters, for his first term, thus eliminating his first term from consideration in the two-term limit.  Opposition parties strongly rejected these claims, and when the CNDD-FDD announced on April 25th that Nkurunziza would run again, protests broke out.  Large-scale protests continued for weeks, with the Nkurunziza government cracking down heavily on protesters, the media, and the opposition.

On May 13th, Nkurunziza was in Tanzania attending a regional summit on the crisis.  General Godefroid Niyombare, Nkurunziza’s former Intelligence Chief who was fired for his opposition to the third term, announced that Nkurunziza’s government had been dismissed.  Nkurunziza attempted to return to the country but his plane was turned away.  After returning to Tanzania he maintained his intention to return to the country, and over the next day many conflicting reports of his location emerged.  In Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, Nkurunziza loyalists fought off the attempted coup.  On May 15th, Nkurunziza returned to the country and the coup leaders admitted their failure.  Prior to the coup, the military had been seen as a relatively successful organization.  During the past few weeks of protest, while the police had reacted heavily to protesters, the military had been a relatively stabilizing force.  The military factionalized, however, and sections of the military supported the coup while others opposed it.

Protests continued after the coup and the opposition maintained their stance opposing a third term.  On May 23rd, the leader of the Union for Peace and Development, Zedi Feruzi, was assassinated.  Although the perpetrator has not been confirmed, it is suspected to be someone affiliated with Nkurunziza, and many opposition parties responded by announcing a boycott of the election.  Due to the unrest, elections were postponed and the government eventually decided to schedule Parliamentary elections for June 26th and Presidential elections for July 15th.  In response to the actions of the Nkurunziza government, the influential Catholic Church withdrew its support for the elections.  Agathon Rwasa, leader of the main opposition party, the FNL, altered his position on boycotting the elections repeatedly,and although he opposes the actions of Nkrunziza’s government, he no longer intends to boycott.

Most media sources continues to be shut down, as are all the universities.  Around 80 people have been killed since April and over 100,000 people fled to neighboring countries during the peak of the conflict.  Grenade attacks, usually against police, have increased in frequency and opposition supporters are suspected.  There are also threats of violence from the Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD.  It seems likely that Nkurunziza will win the upcoming elections, as the the opposition’s chances of victory will be hindered by their fragmented nature, Nkurunziza’s repression, and their limited campaigning as a result of their threats to boycott.  Nkurunziza also holds great popularity in rural areas.  On the diplomatic front, the US has stated its opposition to Nkurunziza’s third term, and the UN has repeatedly expressed their concern at the situation and appointed a special envoy to aid peace efforts.

The conflict has demonstrated some positives.  For one, if crisis is averted, it could very well go down as a model of atrocity prevention.  Burundi has long been marked as a country at risk of conflict, and the atrocity prevention community has been able to quickly implement a fairly coordinated response.  Also, conflicts provoked by this crisis have remained political and not ethnic, unlike the 1972 genocide and the Civil War from 1993 to 2005.  Still, there remain many dangers.  As conflict progresses politicians may attempt to mobilize along ethnic lines.  Also, the opposition may turn to more violent methods due to their failure to create change in the political arena.  Finally, it is unclear how the country will react to an expected Nkurunziza victory in July’s election.  It is possible that this crisis is eventually seen as a hiccup on the path to a more prosperous Burundi, but there could just as easily be far worse to come.

Timmy Hirschel-Burns is a rising junior at Swarthmore College and STAND’s Policy Intern.  You can follow him on Twitter at TimH_B

This violence led the UN Security Council to refer al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court in 2005, and in 2009 the ICC issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The ICC is not able to arrest individuals themselves, but instead relies on its 123 member states to carry out arrests. Fear of arrest has restricted al-Bashir’s travel, yet he travelled to a number of non-member states as well as Rome Statute signatories Kenya, Nigeria, and Chad, which all did not carry out their legal obligation to arrest al-Bashir.
South Africa, an ICC member, looked likely to follow in the footsteps of these three countries as al-Bashir travelled to the country for an African Union summit. Al-Bashir’s decision to visit the country suggests he was given reassurances that he would not be arrested. However, after he arrived in South Africa on Sunday, a court ordered al-Bashir to remain in the country until they decided on Monday whether South Africa had a duty to arrest al-Bashir under their commitment to the ICC. The decision came as a surprise, including seemingly to South Africa’s government, which argued that since al-Bashir was visiting an African Union summit in a diplomatic capacity, South Africa was exempt from its ICC obligations.

On Monday, the court heard arguments on South Africa’s obligation to arrest al-Bashir. Somehow, officials lost track of al-Bashir’s whereabouts, and as the court heard arguments al-Bashir boarded his jet at Waterkloof air base and departed for Sudan. There was initially confusion on al-Bashir’s whereabouts, as the Sudanese government claimed he had left the country while South Africa’s government said his name had not been on the list of passengers on the plane. The court eventually ruled that South Africa did have an obligation to arrest al-Bashir, but by that time he had left from South Africa. On al-Bashir’s return to Sudan he was greeted by over 1,000 supporters at the airport.

Questions remain about how al-Bashir was able to leave South Africa. The South African government may have exploited a legal loophole by allowing him to leave from a military air base. The South African High Court has ruled that South Africa violated its own Constitution by failing to arrest al-Bashir, and it is still unclear whether the South African government really knew whether al-Bashir was on the plane as it left the country. South Africa’s reluctance to arrest al-Bashir is consistent with the shift in the foreign policy towards prioritizing African allies, many of which see the ICC as selectively targeting Africans. After the risks al-Bashir ended up facing on this trip, it seems unlikely he will travel to signatories of the Rome Statute again. As violence continues on a large scale in Darfur, chances of al-Bashir’s arrest look slimmer than ever.

STAND, the US-based student movement to end mass atrocities, is merging with the Aegis Trust as the US branch of the Aegis Youth Department. Founded in 2003 by a group of Georgetown students, over the following years STAND chapters sprang up at schools and colleges across the USA. Originally an acronym for ‘Students Taking Action Now: Darfur’, STAND subsequently expanded its focus to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities wherever they may occur. 

This is a mission shared by the Aegis Trust, which developed in 2000 from the work of the UK National Holocaust Centre. Aegis addresses genocide as a public health issue and works to prevent it in three stages; first, through commemoration and peace-building education designed to break long-term cycles of violence; second, through research, evidence-based policy advice and advocacy for people now at risk of mass atrocities; third, through support for survivors and communities trying to rebuild when genocide is past.

Responsible for the Kigali Genocide Memorial in Rwanda – a site where some 250,000 victims of the 1994 Rwandan genocide lie buried – Aegis is now being urged by leading figures in Kenya, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR) to take its successful model for peacebuilding beyond Rwanda’s borders.

In particular, the move to help CAR is backed by a youth-led campaign launched in February by STAND and Aegis Students, the youth arm of the Aegis Trust. With STAND now sharing the Aegis umbrella, ‘Action for CAR’ (www.action4CAR.org) promises to be the first such international youth-led campaign.

“Aegis is an international leader in the field of genocide prevention and we’re excited to be a part of their expansion,” said Natasha Kieval, Student Director at STAND. Mac Hamilton, STAND Executive Manager added, “Merging with Aegis strengthens our impact and broadens our resources to fight against genocide and mass atrocities internationally. By joining Aegis, with their focus on youth empowerment for peacebuilding, we will only expand our commitment to experiential student leadership.”

“We have long admired the passion and commitment of our colleagues at STAND. The Aegis team is delighted to be joined by them in this merger,” says Swims, CEO of the Aegis Trust. “We know from experience just how important youth-led advocacy and peacebuilding are in breaking cycles of violence, and we look forward to working closely with our American colleagues not only for the Central African Republic, but ultimately for the prevention of mass atrocities wherever people are at risk.”